[140 cont.]
175 Kirghiz-Kazaks without paying duty (3).
[643 439]

3. See Miller, History of Siberia /Opisanie Sibirskogo Tsarstva.../, p. 87, and Karamzin, op. cit., Vol. IX, p. 661.

The conquest of Siberia which took place not long after brought this people closer to the Russians.

[643] [141] Kuchum, the last khan of Siberia, was himself a Kirghiz-Kazak. When he had made himself master of Isker by force of arms and by putting to death the princes Yediger and [662] Bekbulat, who ruled there (1), it was indispensable that he have

1. See the Chronicles of Siberia; Fisher's History of Siberia /Sibirskaia Istoriia..., 1774/, introduction, article 84; Karamzin's history of the Russian empire, Vol. IX, p. 644.

around him an army made up of his former compatriots. Thus Yermak and the companions of his adventures undoubtedly fought against the real Kazaks, or Kirghiz-Kazaks.

[721 797] Murtaza, Kuchum's father, was probably quite a powerful sovereign, for he not only gave his son a year to conquer the land, but also sent him additional mullahs to spread the Moslem religion in Siberia (2).

2. See Miller's History of Siberia and Fisher's History of Siberia, introduction, articles 86 and 87.

175 After Yermak, Kuchum, as we know, was driven out of
648 Isker by Seidak, who later fell into the hands of the Russians.
662 Uraz Mehmet, the tsarevitch or sultan of the Kazaks and nephew of Tevkel, who called himself khan of the Kazaks and

[141 cont.]
175 Kalmuks (3), was taken prisoner with Seidak.
648
662

3. This is what it says in Karamzin, op. cit., Vol. X, p. 98, yet the bringing together of these two titles seems very extraordinary to us.

This event not only gave Tsar Fedor the power to revive his father's plans concerning the Kirghiz-Kazaks, but also the right to call himself their sovereign.

175 Tevkel, who wished to free his nephew, sent an ambassador
643 to Moscow in 1594 with a letter to the Tsar in which he begged
636 the latter to accept him with all his horde as subjects and to send him Uraz Mehmet (4).

4. See Kirghiz [i.e. Kazak] matters, 1794 and 1795; in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow and the reference to them in Karamzin, op. cit., Vol. X, note 332.

Knowing the customs and habits of the Kirghiz-Kazaks, one can be certain that this proposition was no more than a [142] meaningless promise in order to free Uraz Mehmet, one which Tevkel had no intention of keeping whether his nephew were given up to him or not. This he evinced when the Tsar replied to him by letter in 1795 that he accepted him with all his horde as his subjects and that he was sending him firearms, but that as proof of his allegiance he required him to force the khan of Bukhara to make peace and to compel Kuchum to submit. He promised to set Uraz Mehmet (1) at liberty as soon as Tevkel presented one of

1. Godunov later named this prince tsar of Kasimov. Karamzin, op. cit., Vol. IX, p. 22.

[145 cont.]

175 Turkestan at the beginning of the 17th century, and this city was
721 always the residence of their khans. The year in which this conquest took place and the leader of the campaign are unknown. We could not even discover where Khan Murtaza, Kuchum's father, lived, nor whether his descendants reigned over the Kirghiz [-Kazaks] for a long period. Nor did we have any more success in our research concerning Khan Ak-Nazar, who attacked the uluses of the Nogais in 1569, when Semen Maltsov, the envoy of Tsar Ivan the Terrible was there (2). We have gathered

2. See above, p. 140.

some definite evidence, however, that Ishim khan of the Kirghiz-Kazaks, held Turkestan around 1630.

175 Abulgazi Baiadur is the first to speak of it, and it is re-
[114] ferred to for the second time in the Annals of Siberia. We have found still more information about it in the archives of the Border Commission in Orenburg, in the file for 1748.

Abulgazi Baiadur made the acquaintance of the Kirghiz-Kazaks and Khan Ishim about the year 1630 (3), because at this

3. Histoire Généalogique des Tatars, /Leiden, 1726/, Pt. IX, Chapter XI.

time he was forced by his brother Isfandiar, khan of Urgendzhi, to flee his homeland, and he withdrew to Turkestan, where Khan Ishim [146] received him and protected him for three months. After that he escorted him to Tashkent and placed him under the protection of Tursun, khan of that country. Two years
662 later these two princes fell into disagreement. Ishim killed
578 Tursun and seized Tashkent, and Abulgazi withdrew into the realm of Bukhara.

175 Ishim Khan is known in the Siberian chronicles for his
721 disagreements and his wars, and particularly for the wars of his son Djangir, or Iangir, with the kungtaidji of the Dzungars, Batur, or Bagatyr (1). Fisher says that Bagatyr opened war on

1. Fisher, Sibirskaia Istoriia..., Bk. IV, Pt. 3, paragraph 13.

175 [150 cont.]
631 We could not find any information on Pulat, son of Khan
173 Tiavka and father of Abul Mahmet, who is found in the table.

The traditions say only that the calm re-established by
175 Tiavka did not last long among the Kazaks. Dissensions and
721 troubles began again, and the neighboring peoples were quick to profit from them. On the west they were attacked by the Volga Kalmuks [Kalmyk], and on the north by the Bashkirs and the Cossacks of Siberia. But the most terrible of all were the Dzungars to the east. At this time their chief was the powerful Kungtaidji Galdan Tsyren, who not only made all the nomadic peoples tremble but also spread terror in Russia and China. In this unfortunate situation, the Kazaks could not expect help except from the power of Peter the Great, whose vast genius, concerned with the glory and welfare of his people, watched over the Asian border while he had the most important dealings in Europe.

175 Prince Gagarin was governor of Siberia at that time. The
648 Tsar commanded him not only to open relations with the Kazaks,
662 but to help them, if possible, against Galdan Tsyren, in order to put some check on the continual increase of power of the Dzungarian leader. Gagarin carried out the Tsar's commands in 1717, and the Kazak khans, Tiavka, Kaip, and Abulkhair (2)

2. We have drawn this information from works and translations /Sochineniia i Perevody, k Polze i Uveseleniiu Sluzhashchiia/ of January, 1760. See the article on the "golden saber" /Izvestie o pesotnom zolote v Bukharii... (On the Gold
[43] Dust in Bukharo)/. The Khan Tiavka in question must be the famous legislator of the Kazaks of whom we have spoken. But at this time he was already very old. His weakness and the loss of power which ensued, were no doubt the cause of the election, while he still lived, of the khans Abulkhair and Kaip, whose names we see here for the first time (the year 1717).

[150 cont.]

175 replied by [151] promising to be obedient to Russia in all things.
649 These relations had no sequel, however, for Prince Gagarin was
[662] recalled to Moscow shortly after, and Tiavka, the oldest and most cautious of the khans, died. His companions did not know enough to profit from this favorable situation. Instead of joining together again to ask Russia's protection against the Dzungars, they
[578] began to quarrel among themselves, and without any thought of the general welfare they continued in their usual calling, that is, they pillaged all their neighbors. And Russia, who had offered them help and protection, was not the last to suffer from
[726] this. Not content with their frequent raids across the borders of Siberia, in that same year, 1717, they moved in as far as Novo-Sheshminsk (in the Kazan guberniya), took the city, and laid it waste, and although they were driven out with great losses, they
[727] took away a large number of prisoners. This last expedition was made by the subjects of Khan Abulkhair (1). Kaip was afraid

1. See Rychkov's History of Orenburg /Istoriia Orenburgskaia/ and governor
[43] Nepluev's reports to the senate. Rychkov does not say who commanded the Kazaks in this expedition, but Nepluev says that it was Khan Abulkhair, who later became a subject of the Russian empire.

that it might be attributed to him and that he might be punished, although innocent, for the crime of his rival, so he sent a letter
[728] in 1718 to Peter I, in which he offered perpetual peace and alliance (2).

2. This letter, as well as the reply made to it by the governor of Kazan, is still preserved today /1832/ in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

175 This letter, however, did not stop the just vengeance of
721 the dwellers along the border, who were annoyed by the constant
726

175 [154 cont.]
128 demarcation dividing the history of the Kazaks into two parts.

The union of the Middle Horde and the Little Horde to
175 Russia brought them closer to us, but it did not give us the means
128 of following the successive march of events which took place in
114 the Great Horde, which remained independent. For this reason our historical information on its situation in the 18th century is far more imperfect than that which we possess on the Kazaks who were Russian subjects. This makes it necessary for us to divide [155] into two parts the period from 1730 to our times. In the first part we will examine the history of the Great Horde, while in the second there will be an account of the events which took place in the Middle Horde and the Little Horde.

Chapter IV. A Look at the History of the Great Horde from 1730 until our Times.

x648 Having said that the Kazak Great Horde did not participate at all in the voluntary submission of the two other hordes to Russia, we must first clarify a fact which could be imputed to us as a contradiction.

It is seen in the archives as well as in Rychkov's history of Orenburg that Sultan Erali, who traveled to St. Petersburg to submit in person for his father Abulkhair to the Empress Anna, was accompanied by "deputies of the Great Horde, who came to give the same assurances of submission, and this horde, like the other two, received a letter patent for its acceptance among Russian subjects on July 10, 1734."

If there were no fabrication in this matter, it alone would suffice, no doubt, to refute our statement. But a thorough investigation of the events of this period proves the contrary to be the case.

x648 The Kazaks Aralbai and Arasgeldy-Batyr, who accom-
●662 panied Sultan Erali to St. Petersburg, did indeed belong to the Great Horde, but they were neither its deputies nor its representatives. Instead they were only the partisans or mercenaries of Khan Abulkhair, who [156] wished, by attributing to himself

[156 cont.]
[648] [662] power over the Great Horde which he did not possess, to make himself important in the eyes of the Russian court and thus to acquire influence over the entire Kazak nation.

Empress Anna's letter patent of July 10, 1734 proves Abulkhair's deceit. First of all, this letter is presented in the name of various beys and elders and not in the name of Djulbars, who was then commander of the entire Great Horde, as is known from several documents and Rychkov's History of Orenburg. Furthermore, in the letter patent it says: "Our subject Abulkhair Khan has reported to us as a faithful subject that he has already accepted you among the ranks of our subjects, and for this purpose he has sent your deputies Aralbai and Arasgeldy-Batyr to our court." These words are founded upon Abulkhair's writings and the oral declarations made by his son, but neither the one nor the other promoted anything but falsehoods. On the one hand, it is recognized that Abulkhair, who lived a long distance from the Great Horde, could never have any influence upon it. On [636] the other hand, we see that this horde never took an oath of loyalty to Russia and was not counted among her subjects. In the third place, it must be noted that the head of the Orenburg expedition, Kirilov, who received this letter patent at the moment of his departure from Petersburg, did not even send it to its destination. It is probable that he felt this move to be [57] indecorous when he arrived at the border and was able to appreciate the truth of the circumstances mentioned in this document.

[648] [439] The second proposal to admit the Kazaks of the Great Horde as Russian subjects is much more probable than the first, though little more sincere. This was made in 1738, not by a man claiming to be chief of the Great Horde but by Djulbars, the true and legitimate chief of this horde. Having learned of the founding of a Russian city at the mouth of the Ori River and the opening of trade with the Kazaks of the Middle and the Little Hordes, he sent to ask for the same benefits, and to help [157] attain his end, he proposed making not only his own people Russian subjects, but also the neighboring nations, if it was

[159 cont.]

*648 721 We are obliged to note with surprise, however, that in spite of these conquests and hostilities of a people subject to Galdan Tsyren, the Great Horde never dared to go and attack the Dzungars, nor even to call themselves independent of them.

*648 662 Some years later, in 1749, Tiul Biu, who had been driven out of Tashkent by Kusiak [sic] Bek and was dissatisfied by his insignificance, wished to elevate himself through the protection of Russia, and he sent deputies to Orenburg to propose that he become a Russian subject (1). His weakness was no doubt known

1. Tevkelev mentions this in one of his journals.

to the Russian government, and his proposal also had no effect.

[152] The terror with which the Dzungars filled the Kazaks and the apparent submission of the latter lasted until internal dissensions began to weaken the Dzungars and until these dissensions finally led to the complete dispersal of this people, as is known. The disagreement had scarcely begun to be noticeable when the Kazaks took the most active part in it. They offered asylum to all the exiled Dzungarian princes and zaisangs, and joined with [726] them to avenge their wrongs. They attacked their enemies, and on the pretext of helping the unfortunate, they never let the opportunity pass of weakening their old enemies by raids. Finally, when the Chinese wished to interfere in the dissensions of the Dzungars, and the success of their arms had reduced Galdan Tsyren's successors to a state of utter weakness, then the Kazaks of the Great Horde took Amursan's (2) side and formed a part of

2. This prince was the last Dzungarian sovereign. At first he was a subject of China, then her enemy, and he died in Russia.

the army which opposed the invaders [160] until 1756, the time when the Dzungarian empire, which had been so powerful ten years earlier, fell under the blows of the Chinese. The people who had

[160 cont.]

comprised this empire were exterminated or dispersed, and the lands they had occupied remained deserted.

This event brought about two great advantages for the Kazaks. It delivered them from enemies who were as restless as they were dangerous, and it gave them the means of extending their pasture lands over excellent places.

The Bogdo Khan /emperor/ of China was far from being opposed to their occupying the ravaged steppes of Dzungaria, and indeed he tried to attract them there. To halt raids, he established a fortified line between them and their old lands, which is still called the New Line today.

Thus the Kazak Great Horde, which had been constricted for so long, expanded on all sides to turn the best pasture lands to account. The part of this horde which came closest to the Chinese frontier and mixed with some of the remnants of the Dzungars was punished several times by force of arms for its usual brigandage, and it became subject to China and remains among Chinese subjects to this day. The others, who nomadize a little further west, have retained their independence.

Some fractions of these two groups live next to the Buruts, and having often had to fight against them, have become more warlike and dangerous than all the other Kirghiz-Kazaks. We could not enumerate all their continual battles with their neighbors here, but we cannot help mentioning the violent attack they made in 1771 against the Kalmuk Torguts, who were fleeing from Russia under the command of the famous Ubashi.

The man who distinguished himself most in this event was Erali, sultan of the Great Horde, who was known in China for his bravery and who received the title of knight or paladin of the court from the Bogdo Khan (1). When he had learned of the

1. We have taken this information [161] on the exploits of this sultan from the Chinese work by Prince Tsichi [Chi Shih?], which is about the flight of the Torguts and was translated into Russian by Lipovtsov.

[162 cont.]
[648 726] preferred to humbly ask permission to pass beyond toward the Ili River. Erali pretended to consent but had the intention of striking
[662] a most terrible blow against the fleeing prince after having lulled him into security to some extent. And this is exactly what happened. Scarcely had the Kalmuks moved away from the Kazaks and set up their camp to spend the night when Erali and his allies attacked them abruptly, annihilated whole groups which had gone
[727] to sleep without taking precautions, and took an immense booty of prisoners, various objects, and livestock. The third part of the Great Horde, which had camped in the neighborhood of Tashkent from the time of Galdan Tsyren, did not move after the annihilation of the Dzungars but began to establish itself on the spot in the localities it occupied, and persecuted the neighboring cities and villages more strongly. Tashkent was the city which suffered most. Raids, the pillage of caravans, and the almost complete loss of arable lands brought about the absolute ruin of its inhabitants. Although they were not subjects of the Kazaks, they were dependent upon them for everything and were obliged to purchase all the necessities of life and trade from them at a high price.

In 1760 a large number of Karakalpaks [Kara-Kalpak] joined this part of the Great Horde. These Karakalpaks lived at the mouth of the Syr [Darya] River, but being hemmed in by the Little Horde, especially under Khan Nurali, they had retreated further east. It is not known why the Kazaks, who were so powerful, did not seize Tashkent completely and establish themselves there. But there is no doubt that this city has had to suffer from their aggressions until our day. The khans of this country, being weak and unenterprising, have tried to avert these raids by favors, gifts, and concessions more than by resistance and
[829] vigorous measures. The Kazaks are accustomed to viewing indulgence as [163] a sign of weakness, and consequently this kind of behavior, far from disarming them, leads them to renewed violence.

Tashkent proved the truth of this by its own experience some time later when Iunus Khodja became ruler of this city.

[165 cont.]

Chapter V. Historical Studies of the Kirghiz-Kazak Middle and Little Hordes from 1730 until our Times (1832).

X 648 The events which have taken place among the Middle and Little Hordes since their union with Russia are so interrelated that it is impossible to separate them. For this reason we are combining into a single description the historical account we wish to give our readers concerning these two hordes from the year 1730 until our times.

At the end of Chapter III we said that the Kazaks who refused to submit to Russia at a time when the public interest would have forced them to do so later became subjects of Empress Anna for the personal advantage of a single individual.

X 648 643 This individual was Khan Abulkhair, of whom we have already spoken. He was chief of a large part of the Little Horde, and his power extended over some tribes of the Middle Horde, and he had the well-being of his people in mind. But he thought [662] still more about means of consolidating his power and rising above his rivals and enemies, especially above Khan Kaip, who also ruled over a part of the Little Horde.

The situation of the Kazaks in 1730 favored Abulkhair's ambitions. His subjects were enervated by frequent losses of men and goods; hemmed in on all sides by their neighbors, who warred against them; and expected [166] new misfortunes at every moment; and they were ready then for any sacrifice. The Khan knew how to profit from their frame of mind, and he announced to them definitively that there was no way out except voluntary submission to Russia.

X 648 662 At first this proposition was rejected, but Abulkhair no doubt knew how to point out, with such paternal solicitude and persistence, the misfortunes which menaced the Kazaks without the support of Russia; he depicted them so vividly and his arguments were so convincing that they were irresistible. When Abulkhair's adherents had compared the remote advantages they

[166 cont.]
could derive from their liberty with the pressing need for immediate help, they decided to submit themselves to Empress Anna, perhaps with a firm resolve to return to their independence at the first opportunity. The number of those who took part in this resolution was not great (1), but the Khan could not lose time

1. Tevkelev said very clearly in his report to the Empress after he returned from being among the Kazaks (this will be discussed below) that Abulkhair was submitting himself to Russia without the consent of the people, with the exception of a small number of his trusted followers.

in increasing it and thus fail to profit from the first effects of his remonstrances. At once he chose several deputies from among those on whom he could count the most and sent them to Buturlin, voivode of Ufa, under the escort of Aldara, chief of the Bashkirs, with a written proposal acknowledging allegiance to Russia. These deputies arrived in Ufa in the month of July, 1730, and from there Buturlin sent them to St. Petersburg.

In his letter Abulkhair explained the reasons which had led him to submit himself. He spoke of the misfortunes and adversities which the Kazaks had had to endure from the Dzungars. He recalled the attacks of the Volga Kalmuks, the Bashkirs, and the Yaik /Ural/ Cossacks. He promised to maintain himself at his own expense, allowing Russia to hope for his aid in overthrowing her enemies, and in the meanwhile, he demanded troops [167] to help him overcome the people of Khiva, the Karakalpaks, and the Aral people, and finally he acknowledged himself and his horde to be subjects of the empire forever.

This unexpected event, the reasons for which were not yet known, produced the greatest joy in Petersburg. It was that much more glorious for the empire that without the slightest bloodshed it acquired several hundreds of thousands of additional subjects. It promised peace and safety to the southeastern

[170 cont.]
x 648 cleverness triumphed over force.

● 662 x 648 Vexed by the presence of the Russians and fearing their influence, the Kazaks firmly resolved to rid themselves of these distasteful guests. For this reason they announced to Tevkelev that they were going to call a general assembly of the nation, at which they would definitively decide whether they would or would not swear the oath of allegiance to Russia, and that he himself should be present at the assembly without being accompanied by anyone. It was all but certain that they wished to assassinate him, and yet Tevkelev did not refuse this invitation and even knew how to turn it to his own advantage.

x 648 646 662 He knew the greediness of the Kazaks, and he was guided by the Khan and his partisans. He took care to secure himself by gifts to certain of his principal and most dangerous enemies, and next he appeared at the assembly. Emboldened by the hope of having defenders and seeing himself placed in a position where he must perish or distinguish himself, he showed all the firmness, eloquence, and presence of mind of which he had given so many indications to the Kazaks and which had yielded him the greatest consideration on the part of the Moslems. Bukenbai, a Kazak elder who was as eminent as he was respected in the Middle and the Little Hordes, was the first to proclaim himself his protector. Tevkelev,together with this elder and with Khan Abulkhair, who presided in person over this assembly, spoke with such force and authority in favor of Russia that the party which was opposed to the Khan was won over by the arguments of his partisans. The result was that all the persons in attendance, starting with Abulkhair and Shemiaka, khan of the Middle Horde, swore the oath of loyalty to Russia. All this took place in 1732. As he was far from the border, Tevkelev had not yet had time to inform the government of the success of his mission when violent disturbances took place in the Middle Horde.

x 648 At first the Khan and the tribal chiefs envied the [171] power which Abulkhair was to gain by his alliance with the court of Petersburg, and they even feared him. But the common people, among whom there were fewer partisans of Russia than in the Little Horde, did not wish to give up their independence. They saw

[177 cont.]
with goods to the realm of Bukhara and further, if possible, and likewise to seek to attract merchants from different parts of Asia to come to Russia;

11. To send geodetic specialists with the first caravan to examine places and draw maps;

12. To look for mines as much as possible and to examine the place where, according to Abulkhair, there was supposed to be gold;

13. To seek to establish a port on the Aral Sea and to hold armed vessels there, and to build a few longboats on the Yaik (Ural) River at first to this end, and after having taken them down, to keep them ready at all times with all their gear; and when the city is built and the relations with the Kazaks and Karakalpaks are more stable, to transport [178] these vessels thus dismounted to the Aral Sea during the winter, with the consent of Abulkhair and the Kazak princes, and there to assemble them and arm them with artillery;

14. To buy Kazak horses for the cavalry at favorable moments;

15. To be active in the discovery, exploitation, and sale of metals (excepting gold and silver) which are to be found in the Kazak steppes, according to the principles of trade without losing time in observing forms.

In order to make it easier for Kirilov to execute these orders, everyone everywhere was directed to give him all the help possible.

He was also entrusted with complementary diplomatic instructions, whose ends were:

1. To watch the Bashkirs, among whom there had been frequent disturbances up to that time;

2. To watch the Kazaks likewise;

3. If one group or the other came to an uprising, to use one people against the other in order to spare the Russian troops;

4. To seek to acquire precise information promptly about contiguous peoples;

5. Above all to watch the behavior of the Dzungars, to seek means of putting an end to their raids upon the Siberian colonies, and to divert them from levying tributes on the peoples

[185 cont.]

×648 was never sent and still remains today in the archives of the Border Commission in Orenburg (1).

1. See the ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of December 30, 1737.

×648 669 The Bashkir revolt had still not been put down. Abulkhair was afraid to take any part in this revolt, and he himself suggested to Tatishchev that he help to subdue the rebels. The higher authority was informed of this proposal and gave permission for it to be accepted (2), authorizing the Khan to enter the land of the

2. Ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of March 22, 1738.

Bashkirs, provided however that in acting against the rebels he would leave in peace those who remained loyal and would defend their persons and properties if necessary. In defiance of this order, ×648 726 Abulkhair pillaged the lands of the Bashkirs for two consecutive months without distinguishing between rebels and loyal subjects, and the results proved that he had no other end in proposing his ● [667] services but to gorge himself and his Kazaks on booty. It is even asserted that he intended to make his son khan of the Bashkirs, ×648 726 727 and when he entered the lands of this people, he announced himself their protector and defender before the Russian government, but when he saw that his deceit was a failure he began the pillage. As a consequence it was commanded that he be made to depart from the lands of the Bashkirs as soon as possible. Tatishchev carried out this order with gentle means and without wrangling.

The son of Abulkhair Khan, Erali, remained in Orenburg as hostage, however.

While Abulkhair was carrying out his ravages against the Bashkirs, part of his horde, which was camping at the mouth of the Ural, renewed its attacks against the Kalmuks and took many Russians prisoners during one of the raids (3). Fearing the just

3. See the reports sent from Astrakhan,

[187 cont.]

X 648 Tatishchev replied that he would not fail to make his submission known to the Empress. He promised him assistance and protection, but suggested, at the same time, that he swear the oath again. Abulkhair responded that he had already sworn the oath once, but in spite of this he was agreeable to swearing it again. At this the most senior member of the Moslem clergy was ushered into the tent with the Koran, and a[188] golden rug was brought on which the Khan knelt, and after having heard the reading of the oath, he kissed the Koran.

[793 778 641]

Immediately after the ceremony Tatishchev put aside for him a rich saber mounted in gold which, as a special mark of favor, the Khan was not to draw except against the enemies of Russia. At the same moment the elders and the common Kazaks swore the oath before Tevkelev in other tents.

The ceremony ended with a feast, during which, in order to divert and astonish the guests, the health of the Empress and that of the Emperor were drunk to, to the sound of the cannon.

The following day Sultan Nurali, eldest son of the Khan, arrived in Orenburg. He too was shown great honor, although less than that shown to his father. He too swore the oath in Tatishchev's [431] presence and later received in the name of the Empress a saber mounted in silver.

The first meeting of the head of the Orenburg expedition with the Khan was soon followed by several others. Tatishchev and Abulkhair paid each other frequent visits, both in Orenburg and outside the fortress in the camp of the Kazak chief, in public and also in private. In these meetings it was settled:

1. That Erali Sultan, Abulkhair's son, who lived in Orenburg as hostage, should be sent back to the horde, and Khodji Akhmet, another son of the Khan should take his place.

2. That the Khan obligated himself to free and send back to Russia all Russian prisoners, not only those within the horde, but also those in all the neighboring lands.

● [662] We will mention in passing that he could never have carried out this promise, and when he made it he knew the impossibility of keeping his word.

[192 cont.]
their seal on the leaves on which the oath was written in lieu of signature. In imitation of them, 128 Kazak elders of the Middle Horde swore the oath in a neighboring tent, and the people took the oath outdoors. This ceremony was followed by a feast, the firing of artillery, etc.

On the following day the Khan, accompanied by Ablai, returned to Orenburg to discuss Kazak matters. During this meeting Prince Urusov particularly insisted that they should escort the caravans coming from Russia or returning there, that they should surrender the goods seized by the Great Horde from Muller's caravan, and that they should put an end to the disagreements existing between the Kazaks and the Volga Kalmuks. They were unable to satisfy this last request because they belonged to a people which was more accustomed to pillage than to obeying its chiefs. Furthermore, the Kalmuks had suffered more from the Little Horde, which was their closest neighbor. We will add, by way of proof, that in this same year, 1740, Abulkhair himself sent nearly 3,000 Kazaks to ravage the Kalmuk uluses.

It was impossible to satisfy the demand for escorts for the caravans. Ablai, who was more powerful than Abul Mahmet, could have assumed this obligation, but it was not to the advantage of the people or the chiefs, since no matter how high a price the escort received, it could not counterbalance the benefits accruing to the Kazaks from seizing the goods.

Two days after the first meeting with the chiefs of the Middle Horde, Prince Urusov invited them, together with the sons of Abulkhair, to come to see the maneuvers of the infantry and artillery. Abul Mahmet and Ablai admired the exercises [193] and especially the fireworks which were displayed in their honor. But in order to avoid meeting Abul Mahmet, Nurali and Erali not only failed to appear in response to the invitation which they had received, but left Orenburg the same day without taking leave of Prince Urusov. It was later learned that the real reason for this hasty departure was the fear of being kept as hostages in Russia at the instigation of Abul Mahmet.

The Khan and the sultans left Orenburg giving every sign of submission and devotion to the Russian government. But the events

[196 cont.]
X 648 Dzungarian sultan (1) made the Kazak leaders see that they were

1. See the orders given in 1742 to Major Miller who was then sent from Orenburg to Galdan Tsyren, having been charged to work for the freeing of Ablai.

obliged to have recourse to the mercy of Galdan in spite of their dependence on Russia. Abul Mahmet sent him an embassy to pay him his respects, and finally he gave him his own son as
X 649 hostage (2). Abulkhair, who was cleverer than Abul Mahmet

2. See the reports of Prince Irakov, who was with the Middle Horde in 1742, in the archives of the Orenburg Border Commission.

and who lived closer to the Russian border, had, on the one hand, less to fear from the Dzungars and, on the other, greater need for the protection of the Russian Empress. Consequently he decided to employ the most subtle deceit in this case. Through his agents he made it known to Galdan's army that he was ready to obey him and that he would send assurances of his submission if it was so desired.

Galdan received this message and, regarding Abulkhair, no doubt, as the most powerful of the Kazak princes, sent his own officers himself to make certain of his submission and to receive the hostages which had been promised. The arrival of these deputies did not cause the Khan, who was as wily as he was full of resources, to lose his natural presence of mind. He did not wish to carry out the request of the Dzungars, and as a Russian subject he was afraid to do so. Therefore he resolved to lead them to Orenburg, where he was [197] preparing to go on the invitation of Nepluev, who was the new commandant there. He had two reasons for such an action. First of all, he could prove his trust in, and absolute obedience to, the Russian government

[197 cont.]
in this way, and second, he could make his excuses to Galdan for not having sent him hostages, for he was certain that the border commander would not permit this.

This was exactly what happened. Abulkhair had scarcely arrived in Orenburg when Nepluev announced to the Dzungarian envoys that since the khan of the Little Horde was a subject of Russia he had no right to negotiate with foreign princes or to give them hostages. The same was stated for the Middle Horde and Khan Abul Mahmet. The Dzungars replied that the Kazaks were constantly making raids in their territories; that it was impossible to have any peace without taking hostages from them; and that besides they themselves had offered to satisfy this demand just as the Great Horde, which having become their vassal, not only gave hostages but also paid a tribute, and because of this there was perfect peace. The Dzungars were told once more that Russian subjects could neither make nor carry out such promises without the consent of their government. Nepluev himself assumed the burden of preventing any more Kazak raids into Dzungarian territory. It was then suggested to the deputies that they return home, but they answered that although they were thoroughly satisfied with their reception by Nepluev, his words were still not enough; for knowing the Kazaks intimately, who had deceived the Russians and the Dzungars alike with their promises of submission, they could expect nothing but pillage and robbery in the future, and that therefore they dared not return home without hostages. Finally, they said openly that they had been sent by their kungtaidji to Khan Abulkhair and not to the Russian government.

Nepluev and the Khan had considerable trouble in persuading them to leave with the promises they had been given, but they finally departed from Orenburg to go directly to their [198] country. Major Müller, who had been in command of the first Russian caravan which was pillaged by the Great Horde, was sent with these deputies, in order to persuade Galdan Tsyren more firmly that the Kazak hordes were vassals of Russia, and to deliver a letter to him from Nepluev.

[198 cont.]

×648 All this took place in August, 1742. At this same time Abulkhair, his son Erali, the famous Batyr Djanibek, several sultans and elders, and the common people who were then with him swore an oath of loyalty to Empress Elizabeth. On this occasion, after the feast, a company of grenadiers performed their rifle practice. The Dzungarian envoys had not yet gone, and Abulkhair did not fail to say to them that one could be secure under the protection of the Empress of Russia, who had such troops.

[128] After the departure of the envoys, Nepluev did his best to show Abulkhair that neither the Little nor the Middle Hordes should attack the domains of Galdan Tsyren. Abulkhair seemed to yield to his admonitions and promised that in future his subjects would not renew their former raids.

Similar admonitions were still more needful to Abul Mahmet, khan of the Middle Horde, who was even closer to the Dzungars and who had recently felt the cruelty with which they avenged their injuries. Nepluev was expecting him at Orenburg at this ×648 ●662 time, and he was only a day's journey from there, but he turned on his tracks because of rumors spread by Abulkhair that he and his elders would be held as prisoners when they arrived on Russian territory. Hoping that the reason for Abul Mahmet's departure would never be known, Abulkhair asserted his own submission to Nepluev, which he set up against the supposed obstinacy of his rival, whom he sought every means of injuring. The motive of all these schemings of Abulkhair was not only to injure Abul Mahmet but also to carry out a plan which was quite difficult to accomplish. He wished to give [199] another son, Chingis, in exchange for his son Khodja Akhmet, who was then a hostage in Orenburg.

[595] But Chingis was the son of a concubine and not of a khaness, and Nepluev, who was acting according to the instructions and views of his predecessors, could not receive Chingis in place of Sultan Khodja Akhmet. The Khan was so angry at this refusal that he [622] wished to leave immediately, but he soon calmed down and agreed to await the decision of the supreme authority on this matter.

The artful, hypocritical, ambitious, and violent nature of Abulkhair was diametrically opposed to the mildness and goodness

[199 cont.]
of Abul Mahmet. When the interpreter Urazlin arrived, sent him by Nepluev, Abul Mahmet frankly admitted the reason for his sudden return from the outskirts of Orenburg and then confessed that fear had made him give his son as hostage to Galdan, after which he swore loyalty to Empress Elizabeth. It was in this same year of 1742 that Barak, the powerful Kazak sultan, swore the oath to the Russian government for the first time, at the same time as Abul Mahmet. He was the leader of a large part of the Middle Horde, and his subjects gave him the title of khan.

As an independent sovereign, he sent deputies to Orenburg after the oath with the request that they be directed to the court, so that they might present his respects to the Empress in person and in his name.

Several months later he showed how insincere this submission was. His deputies were presented to Elizabeth, allowed to kiss her hand, and were overwhelmed with favors and gifts. He himself was sent, through the government of Orenburg, a letter (1)

1. This letter was presented March 24, 1743.

and a golden saber with an inscription to him. Nepluev, who had never seen Barak and knew that he had had no previous relations with Russia, felt obligated to deliver the marks of favor from the Empress, and with this intention he sent him a messenger, who left with his ambassadors to invite him to come to Orenburg.

[200] The proud sultan was angry because the letter and the saber had not been brought by his own embassy and ordered various rude things said to Nepluev's officer, sending him back without having seen him. The primary cause of the gross insolence can only be attributed to Barak's blind pride, and the secondary one can be considered to be the fact that no other gift except the saber accompanied the letter.

Sultan Ablai, who had languished about a year as a prisoner of the Dzungars, was finally liberated in the spring of 1742, thanks to the efforts of Major Müller, who had been sent to Galdan.

[200 cont.]

×648 662 No matter how insincere the Kazaks' protestations of obedience were and how vain their promises to return the prisoners, protect the caravans, etc., at least from the moment they had declared themselves vassals until the year 1743, neither they nor their subjects had dared to make raids openly on the Russian borders or against their fortresses. But in the course of this year, they gave evidence of extraordinary daring, secretly incited by the same Abulkhair, who never ceased to assure the Russian government of his good faith and of his carrying out of all the duties of a faithful subject. Having been met with a formal refusal to accept his illegitimate son Chingis in place of his son Khodja Akhmet, he was [152] so angry that he began to incite the Kazaks to attack the border villages. One can imagine that his subjects were not slow to profit by counsel which was both advantageous to them and in accord [579] with their customs. At once pillaging, murder, and the carrying off of men and beasts began. Groups made up of from 1,000 to 2,000 bandits threw themselves upon sparsely settled villages, which had only just been founded, and carried away across the Ural River everything which could not escape them or which they could not destroy. Even the fortresses and fortified posts were exposed to their attacks. In one day, [201] 82 men were carried off from the small town of Iletsk. We will not enumerate the other robberies and violences which were committed (1), but limit

1. See the reports of Nepluev to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

ourselves only to saying that the leader of these furious bands was Derbeshali, a sultan and kinsman of Abulkhair, and that his aim was to go to the fortress of Sarachinsk where Khodja Akhmet was and carry him off, after he grew tired of brigandage. Russian troops prevented him from carrying this plan out, but being busy building forts, they could not stop the other raids. Part of their horses were worn out by labor and part ran away into the country, and this made them a prey to plunderers.

[203 cont.]

[648] The order given in this letter was not carried out. On the contrary, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave orders that the Kalmuks as well as the Kazaks were to be prevented from crossing the Ural to attack each other.

[726] It must be supposed that the government changed its mind because of the troubles which broke out at that time on the Siberian frontier. The Dzungarian kungtaidji suddenly advanced with his troops toward the Russian border, and his subjects began to threaten the garrisons with war, while the rumor spread that he wished to attack the establishments of Kolyvano-Voskresensk, where he was attracted by the mines of precious metals.

At this time the Dzungars were still formidable, and an attack by them could not be compared to the raids of the Kazaks. Therefore it was indispensable to prepare adequate forces against them. As a result the insolence of the Kazaks was forgotten, and Nepluev received an order (1) to persuade them to

1. See the ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of November 3, 1744.

make raids against the Dzungars.

It was a difficult task to carry out. Khan Abulkhair still [186] held resentment against Russia in spite of the indulgence granted for his crimes. Abul Mahmet, khan of the Middle Horde, retreated toward Turkestan in order to avoid Abulkhair's intrigues, and thus practically put an end to his relations with the border authorities. Besides he had less need for the help of Russia than the protection of the kungtaidji of the Dzungars, who held his son as hostage. [662] Finally, Abul Mahmet sought to be khan at Turkestan, and this city recognized the authority of Galdan Tsyren.

[664] [204] Sultan Barak, who had sworn allegiance to Russia two years earlier, lived far from her border, and fearing the Dzungars more than the Russians, he, like Abul Mahmet, had given his son to Galdan Tsyren as hostage.

[662] The latter sought to attach the sultans and the common people of the Middle Horde to himself by every means. To attain

[204 cont.]
this he used threats and favors by turns, and finally he bought various Russian articles at his own expense which he had sold to the horde, not only without profit but even at a loss.

Although the circumstances were so opposed to the views of the Russian government, yet the hereditary and inveterate hate of the Kazaks for the Dzungars still had enough power to keep them from being entirely indifferent to the hints of the Russians. They preferred to leave their border in peace rather than neglect the opportunity to attack their perpetual enemies, who at this time threatened to reduce them to complete subservience. In spite of their submission to Galdan Tsyren, the khans and sultans feared his domination more than that of the Russians. However, they took part with the people in the preparations for hostilities which were being made. The tribes of the Middle Horde, who were still suffering from the ravages committed against them in 1741, almost under the walls of Orenburg, were the most anxious to help the Russian troops. They were only waiting for the opening of war between them and the Dzungars, and at the first news of the beginning of hostilities they would have thrown themselves upon the settlements of their enemies with all the fury of semi-primitive people. But their hopes were dashed, for the Dzungars, in spite of their threats, left Russia in peace. This was the only way the Kazaks could have avoided the storm which threatened them, for in spite of all the patience with which the Russian government had borne their raids on the border for more than a year, it had been firmly decided to use the troops [205] stationed on the Orenburg line and others to be added to them in order to punish the Kazaks severely.

During the interval, Sultan Khodja Akhmet, who until then had been detained as hostage in the fort at Sarachinsk, was transferred to St. Petersburg. Although Abulkhair could not have been happy to see his son taken further away when he wished him closer, and although he was furiously angry with Nepluev and allowed himself new violence in his relations with him, still his subjects

[208 cont.]
100 men, and led away an enormous number of livestock.

After this celebrated expedition, several small raids took place on the Russian border.

Khan Abulkhair was still the cause of these new plunderings. He continued to nurse a deep hatred of Nepluev and was angry because the government had not satisfied his complaints against the border authorities and had not given up his son Khodja Akhmet. For this reason he adopted the course of wreaking his vengeance against all the Russians. Not content with the wrong he had committed against Russia through the raids of his subjects, he took the advice of the latter and abused an interpreter whom Nepluev had sent to him with papers, did not let him out of sight, and detained him for about a year, tormenting him in different ways.

It was still too little. Abulkhair's fury was so blind that he sought to persuade his people to depart from Russia and go south into the sands and the waterless deserts. But the Kazaks knew the advantages of the lands neighboring Russia, and they openly refused to obey him in this case. His rage then fell upon those of his subjects who had opposed his plan to move, and he wrote to the border authorities to arrest these people when they entered fortified localities, as the fomenters of all the disturbances.

While he was thus delivering the innocent to punishment, he was preparing the true brigands for a new attack against the Volga Kalmuks and was only waiting for winter to send them off. In January, 1747, when the ice was strong enough on the Caspian Sea, they left their camps, successfully crossed [209] the ice opposite the mouth of the Ural River, and attacked the uluses of their enemies once again. But this time fortune betrayed them: the Kalmuks had been warned of the attack in time and retreated into the western part of their steppes. They were too far away, and it was too dangerous to pursue them; thus the bandits returned with empty hands. Then, to complete their misfortune, the ice began to melt, the passage across the ice became difficult, and they were obliged to cross the Ural River where the Yaik Cossacks, who had been sent against them, were waiting. The passage through the Russian troops was very costly, for when they had reached their shore, many dead were found there, and a greater number drowned in the river, for the ice had broken. Most of their horses fell into the hands of the Russians.

[209 cont.]

Blinded by his resentment, Abulkhair considered this punishment as a new offense against him. He sought every means to harm Russia, and requested the protection of Persia.

His son Khodja Akhmet had been transferred from Petersburg to Kazan, where he had fallen in love with the daughter of a Tatar and asked for her hand in marriage. Abuljhair's impertinences had been so frequent and so serious, that one cannot admire enough the patience with which the court at St. Petersburg put up with it. In order to give this khan one more proof of its indulgence, both toward him and toward his people, Tevkelev, who, as we have said, professed the same religion as the Kazaks, was sent to Orenburg in 1747. Furthermore he had spent more than a year among them and had acquired general respect, and he knew their customs and habits and had always been a friend of Abulkhair's. He was charged with placating Abulkhair through his advice, of reconciling him with Governor Nepluev, and of returning his son Khodja Akhmet to him, but in exchange for another son born of a khaness.

Abulkhair's death, which took place soon after, prevents us from [210] saying what the consequences of his dealings with Tevkelev would have been. But at the opening of these conferences, Abulkhair showed himself disposed to reconciliation. During the summer of 1748, he arrived at the fortress of Orsk (1)

1. This was the name given to the old Orenburg, after the new one was founded on the site which it now occupies.

for an interview with his old friend, and he not only gave as hostage another legitimate son named Aichuvak, who later became a khan, in place of Khodja Akhmet, but he also added the children of some of his elders. Furthermore he promised to deliver immediately all the Russian prisoners taken by his subjects, and promised in writing that the Little Horde would never attack the borders. When he arrived at the horde, however, he secretly

[210 cont.]
[648] dispatched several trusted Kazaks to propose the marriage of his
[662] daughter to the Dzungarian sovereign.

[682] As the Russian government, which was still unaware of this last step taken by Abulkhair, awaited the execution of his promises, it was informed that he had been assassinated.

These are the circumstances which preceded his death.
[726] When he returned from the fortress of Orsk to the auls, he assembled a band of armed Kazaks and moved at their head to pillage the unfortunate Karakalpaks, who had already suffered so much from him and his son. He met Sultan Barak, who had long hated him and who envied him the marks of distinction and the prerogatives which had been granted him by the Russian government. He held a grudge against Abulkhair particularly because
[679] the latter had pillaged the gifts he had been sent by the khan of
[643] Khiva. In addition, both claimed rights of sovereignty over the Karakalpaks who had established themselves in the Kazak horde. Both were violent and vindictive, and consequently their meeting could not take place without a quarrel.

Barak, who had more people with him, was the first to open combat. Abulkhair's band, which was less numerous, could not withstand the first encounter and took to flight, and the Khan, who was carried away by the fugitives, was obliged to follow their example. But Shigai [211] the sultan, son of Barak, overtook him and unhorsed him with a blow of his spear. Then Barak himself arrived and assuaged his bloody rage by killing his enemy with his own hands (1).

1. We have drawn this information from Tevkelev's journals, which are preserved in Orenburg in the archives of the Border Commission.

[726] Although the Karakalpaks had suffered much from Abulkhair, his death only brought them a new blow instead of bringing them relief. For Barak, delivered from his rival, did not miss the chance to attack them and pillage them.

[211 cont.]

This act against a people considered subject to Russia and the assassination of a khan who was a vassal of the empire made Barak afraid to remain in the regions near the Russian borders, and for this reason he hastened to move away from the Aral Sea. Having taken the route toward Turkestan, he seized the towns of Ikan, Otrar, and Saganak and established his camps between these towns. He did not reside here long, however, for the following year (1749), on a visit to a khoja with his two sons, he was poisoned (2).

2. In the papers preserved in the archives of the Border Commission in Orenburg it can be seen that the Kazaks of the Little Horde who came to the Russian border then affirmed that Barak had been poisoned by order of the Dzungarian kungtaidji, who was blamed by Nurali for the assassination of his father.

The news of Abulkhair's death could not have caused an unpleasant impression in Russia. During the last years of his life, the conduct of this khan had been such that the [possibility of the] administration of the Little Horde by a new chief aroused greater hope than Abulkhair's death aroused compassion. The dignity of the empire demanded only that the Kazaks, as subjects, should request the Empress to confirm their new khan. It would have been dangerous and useless to annul the choice made according to the ancient customs of the nation and to designate another arbitrarily. But it seemed easy to cause the people to elect one of Abulkhair's sons. With this in mind Nepluev, after [212] consulting Tevkelev, sent to the horde an officer who was charged with contriving the means of making the choice of the people fall upon Sultan Nurali and if he was successful to convince him as well as the elders of the necessity of sending an embassy to Petersburg to request the confirmation of the Empress.

[212 cont.]

This measure was fully successful. Nurali was proclaimed khan in an assembly of the people, and they sent to the court Sultan Djanibek and several distinguished Kazaks, who came to bring this news to Orenburg. They said they had been sent on behalf of the Middle and the Little Hordes, and requested therefore that Khan Nurali be named khan of the two hordes. Several reasons made it impossible to satisfy this request. 1) The Russian officer who presided at the election of Nurali stated that Djanibek Batyr was the only elder of the Middle Horde who had taken part, and that he had always lived near Abulkhair, as had several tens of ordinary Kazaks who had long been separated from the Middle Horde and who also lived among the subjects of Abulkhair. 2) Almost all the most distinguished sultans of the Middle Horde had either their sons or their closest kinsmen as hostages with the Dzungarian prince, who from that moment had begun to raise claims to sovereignty over the entire horde, and this caused the Russian government grave suspicions as to the obedience of that horde.

On the other hand they did not wish to vex Nurali by presenting a formal refusal to the request of his ambassador, and it was decided to name him khan of the Kazaks without designating any horde. On the day of February 26, 1749, he was sent the imperial letter patent concerning his new office. At the same time another letter patent was sent in the name of the Kazak people to confirm their choice, and Nepluev was enjoined to invite Nurali to come to Orenburg and to proclaim him khan there in an imposing manner.

Before speaking of this ceremony, we will say that [213] Nepluev and Tevkelev were aided in their design to cause Nurali's election by his mother, Khaness Papai, who by her intelligence had won the respect of the entire Little Horde and sometimes had much influence upon its administration. Because she liked the Russians, she had often dissuaded her husband Abulkhair from carrying out plans which were harmful to Russia (1). All this

1. She possessed a stamp with her name,

Y 648 [562] [213 cont.]

which was an absolutely extraordinary distinction among a people accustomed to treating their women as slaves, for they are not allowed to take any part in public affairs.

● [662] was brought to the knowledge of the court, and when Djanibek returned to the horde, he delivered a letter to her from the [431] Chancellor, accompanied by a piece of precious brocade from the Empress.

[721] At the same time as Nurali's election it was learned in St. Petersburg that the Dzungars, at the instigation of Sultan Barak, wished to attack the Little Horde. Although it was later proved that this rumor was false, measures were nevertheless taken to protect the horde from attack.

X 648 643 At Nepluev's invitation, Khan Nurali arrived near Orenburg in the month of July, 1749, escorted by the most distinguished sultans and elders and many commoners. He stopped on the left bank of the Ural River, where a camp had been prepared in advance in order to make a ceremony of his elevation with éclat. Like his father, he was received at the camp with the firing of cannon and with music. The ceremony began with the reading of the letters patent given to him and to his people. Next he was presented with a robe, a cap, and a saber sent by the court. Finally, the new khan knelt and swore an oath of fealty to Russia upon the Koran.

We will not give the details of this ceremony here, because they were repeated at every new elevation, and we will describe it elsewhere in the article on the customs and ceremonies of the Kazaks (2).

2. See Part III [this particular section on customs not translated].

X 648 [664] [214] Having become the khan, Nurali demonstrated that he would not be content with the title but also wished to have the authority. His first request to the Russian government was to

[214 cont.]

x648 [644] obtain auxiliary troops in order to take vengeance against Barak for the assassination of his father. In his second request he asked that those Kazaks whom he described as men of evil intent and harmful to Russia should be arrested on the borders.

x643 662 Barak or his successors and their followers would have failed to escape the vengeance of Abulkhair's sons, no doubt, if they had received support in troops from Russia. But Nurali's exploits would not have ended there. He had planned to use the Russian troops against all his enemies, and especially against those princes of the Middle Horde who did not honor him and whom he wished to annihilate in order to subject their descent lines and tribes to his brothers, and then he would have made himself sole khan of both the Middle and the Little Hordes.

The second request, to arrest the Kazaks of evil intent on the Russian borders, also tended to the same end. He represented it as a necessary measure for the security of Russia, but ambition was its true motive.

On the one hand, the execution of this demand would have been really useful and indispensable for the Russians, for it would have made it possible to deliver into the hands of justice at least a part of the brigands, and, by adding to the power of the Khan, [439] it would have given him new means of acting upon his people. But on the other hand, it could have been the source of an endless number of injustices and would have abolished the commercial exchange which was then just beginning to be established between the Russians and the Kazaks.

For these reasons, the Khan's first request was formally refused, and it was promised that the second would be considered.

x648 [765] Upon his departure from Orenburg, Nurali, in the name of his brothers and his mother Papai, voiced the desire to have some great monument on his father's grave and requested 1,000 workers for 15 days for this end (1). This wish was nothing more than the

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1. All the conversations which the khans had with the border commanders [215] were written down in journals which have been

[216 cont.]

with Nurali to make a definitive agreement [216] on the building of the funeral monument, reported that in order to dissuade their khan from approaching the Russian border, the Kazaks reminded him of the conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan and assured him that if the former nomadic residents of these cities had not settled at a fixed place their descendants would still be free today.

time was unable to give a positive answer. As for the site where Abulkhair had been buried, it lacked stone, lime, and construction timber. While these parleys were taking place, more important matters came up in the horde, and the desire felt by the Russian government to satisfy the request of Abulkhair's family grew weaker with time and circumstances. The map and the façade of the funeral monument made by the engineer and sent to Nurali are still preserved in the Orenburg archives though never executed.

To the Khan's joy, Empress Elizabeth's cabinet and the border authorities at Orenburg claimed only one service. This was to give up the Russians who were languishing as slaves of the Kazaks, and he was sent a special letter patent to this effect from St. Petersburg. Nurali and his brothers pledged themselves to satisfy this most just request, but to do so was beyond the limits of their weak power, and the promise was without effect, like the hundreds or even thousands of similar demands and obligations repeated to this day by the border commanders. Nurali had scarcely returned to the auls from Orenburg when he received ambassadors from the Djungarian kungtaidji, who had come in accordance with the proposal made by his father before his death to ask for his sister in marriage for their sovereign, and promised him the town of Turkestan in lieu of kalym /bride price/. It was difficult for him to form this alliance while

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[216 cont.]
recognizing the suzerainty of Russia, but it was even more difficult to refuse a liaison by marriage with a sovereign who was so dreaded by Nurali's enemies, and especially to miss the chance of taking possession of Turkestan without bloodshed, for [217] his ancestors had reigned there and were buried there, and Abulkhair himself had lived there until he was driven out by the Dzungars.

Balanced between fear and hope, Nurali did not know what to decide. The sultans and elders advised him to send his sister to the kungtaidji without delay and then, relying on his help, to go to take revenge on Barak and his subjects for his father's death. This advice accorded perfectly with his wishes, but he did not see that they were contrary to the interests of Russia, which could punish him for his disloyalty.

Besides this, at that time there was a Russian officer with him who had accompanied him from Orenburg. In the presence of such a witness, he could not act except in secret, and for this reason he dismissed the Dzungarian ambassadors without the girl, but he promised to send her soon. When Nepluev asked the reason for this embassy, Nurali claimed it had come from Galdan Tsyren's son with proposals of peace and friendship. He also pretended that the Dzungars had proposed to him the exchange of the Kazak prisoners they had in their power for Volga Kalmuks, a large number of whom were slaves of the Little Horde. His knavery was of no avail for the Russian officer (1) who was then with the

1. See Captain Iakovlev's journal and reports in the archives of the Border Commission in Orenburg.

horde reported matters as they really were to the border authorities, and these reported them to the higher authorities, who found that an alliance by marriage between the Dzungarian and Kazak sovereigns could bring great harm to Russia. There had even been an example of this already, when Aiuka, khan of the Volga Kalmuk horde, had married Darma Bala, kinswoman of

[217 cont.]
x648 the Dzungarian kungtaidji. She had incited his son Sanzhip to
584 depart for Dzungaria with 15,000 tents in 1701. If the
662 Dzungars, who had already subjugated the Great Horde long since and had hostages from all the sultans of the Middle Horde, also were united with the Little Horde through the alliance of their sovereigns, then the entire population of the lands [218] beginning from the western territories of China of that time until the northern part of the Caspian Sea could be put in movement at the first signal of one single chief, and the entire length of the Russian border, from the upper Irtysh all the way to the mouth of the Ural River, could be exposed to attack on the same day.

In order to avert this danger, it was indispensable for the Russian government to forbid Nurali to become the brother-in-law of the Dzungarian kungtaidji, and it was ordered that all proper measures be taken to prevent this alliance. It was regarded as most efficacious to use the counsels of a man respected by the Khan and known to all the Little Horde, namely Tevkelev. To this end he was sent to Orenburg expressly to have a conference with Nurali. In order to support the advice, favors, and promises with which Tevkelev was to load the Khan, Nepluev was commanded to begin the funeral monument for Abulkhair immediately and to add residences for the khans in order to please Nurali and his brothers. It was likewise decided to accept the illegitimate Chingis as hostage in place of the khan's legitimate brother (1), a thing which had often been refused to Abulkhair.

1. See the ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of November 2, 1749 and August 13, 1750.

During the interval, Nurali was dismayed by the rumor which
[152] was spread that if the Dzungarian kungtaidji had a son by his sister, he would exterminate all the Kazak chiefs and their descendants in order to give that son the position of sole khan of all the Kazaks.

x648 The death of Abulkhair's daughter destined for the chief of the Dzungars, which took place in 1750, reassured Russia.

[218 cont.]
The news of her death arrived in Orenburg before Tevkelev had been able to have a conference with Nurali (2), and prevented

[439]

> 2. While waiting for Tevkelev, Nepleuv had delegated an officer interpreter to Nurali and his mother to advise them and to acquire information about the Dzungarian ambassadors. This interpreter was ordered to present to the Khan, as a rare thing, 10 chetverts of flour and as much [219] groats. The principal aim of this gift was to induce the Kazaks to take wheat from the Russians in exchange for their merchandise.

the latter from being told of the orders given to begin [219] his father's tomb immediately and the intention to receive Chingis as hostage. These measures had become unnecessary in a time of calm.

[441] Being in ignorance of the indulgent disposition of the government and in order to conform to previous demands, Nurali in 1749 presented his legitimate brother Adil as hostage to replace Sultan Aichuvak, and in 1750 he exchanged this brother for his own son Pirali, who was only five years old.

[442] At this time Sultan Batyr, the father of Kaip, then khan of Khiva, and the son of the Kaip who had been the sultan of the Kazaks, opened relations with the authorities in Orenburg. As was already said above, his father Kaip had written in 1718 to Peter the Great. Batyr had inherited his father's hatred for Abulkhair and had never recognized his authority, and for this reason had had no relations with Russia for a long time. But when a part of the Little Horde proclaimed him khan, the equal of Nurali, and when his son had become the sovereign of Khiva, he had still less respect for Abulkhair's son and hoped that Russia would have the same consideration for him as for his rival.

However, at the beginning of his relations with Orenburg, he had not decided to request that he be recognized as khan. In

[219 cont.] In 1750 he only requested the Orenburg authorities, through his envoys, that the Russian caravans proceeding to Khiva and the dominion of Bukhara should pass through his pasture lands, and he undertook to escort them and defend them. In order to give this proposal greater force, his son, Khan Kaip, sent a deputy charged with bearing assurances of peace and amity and also the request that the caravans be sent by way of the auls of his father. This wish of Batyr and his son could not be fulfilled because it tended to do an obvious wrong to Nurali, who in his capacity as a vassal of Russia and a khan recognized by her was [220] in charge of protecting Russian trade in the steppes between the Ural River and the Syr [Darya] and had already undertaken this task.

It is true that one could scarcely count upon his efforts, but the Sultan Batyr's promises presented still less security in view of his distance from the Russian border. For this reason he was answered that the obligation of escorting the caravans across the lands of the Kazak Little Horde was under the jurisdiction of Nurali, that he could help in this, and finally that he was to live on good terms with Nurali if he wished to enjoy Russian protection.

The envoy from Khiva received a reply from Nepluev which contained nothing decisive but was, nevertheless, very honest.

These measures, without regard to their justice, were based on the benefits to Russia. She had to protect and even augment the power of the khans she had installed or recognized, for their weakness would not produce or even promise any use for her. At that time the Kazak hordes had been numbered among her subjects for nearly 20 years. For nearly 20 years she had been losing money in keeping them peaceful, presenting gifts to the sultans and elders, building forts and maintaining troops. Yet, in spite of all these sacrifices, she had been unable during this interval to protect her borders from pillage, nor even to find a way of rescuing her native subjects from the fetters of a people who had submitted to Russia voluntarily. Abulkhair's excuses as to his lack of power, expressed rather rarely because of his vanity, were regarded as subterfuges, as much because of his knavish character as of his

[220 cont.]
[648] open disobedience. Nurali's declarations and his oft repeated re-
[662] quests to use reprisals on the borders by seizing bandits or their kinsmen were more sincere than was believed at the beginning, and later they were taken into consideration. They were also confirmed by the opinion of Tevkelev, who had had experience in relations with the Asiatics, as well as the replies of several sultans who had been requested, like the Khan, with no success over [221] several years, to give up their Russian prisoners.
[721] There were also the examples of Khiva, the land of Bukhara, and other powerful states who regarded reprisals (baranta) as indispensable in order to restrain a nomadic people.

Convinced by its experience and seeing that indulgent patience was far from lessening the temerity of the Kazaks, but
[683 indeed increased it, the Russian government finally decided to
685] behave toward this people in the same manner as did all their other neighbors. Thus the border authorities were given orders (1)

1. Ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of November 27, 1749.

that in case of theft or the carrying off of persons they should require the Khan to release at once what was missing, and if he refused satisfaction or advised that reprisals be taken, they should
[681] take advantage of the first favorable opportunity to seize one of the kinsmen of the guilty person, or even any individual of his tribe (assuming that the guilty person himself did not show himself to the Russians again), and to hold this person under careful guard until the prisoner or the stolen objects should be returned.

This measure was not in harmony with the principles of equity customary among civilized peoples, but it was indispensable with the nomad brigands.

During this same period, in order to oblige Nurali to carry out the requests of the Russian government and to furnish him means of paying for the services his subjects rendered to Russia without injury to himself, he was assigned an annual stipend.
[431] At the same time a rule was set to send various gifts of fixed amounts in the name of the border government. But it was

[222 cont.]
[648] acquaintance of the Russians. Sultan Kuchak, who had been
[473] proclaimed khan by several tribes, had not been confirmed by Russia and had not even sought her protection. The good graces of the Dzungarian prince were more necessary to him, as they were to all [223] the sultans of the Middle Horde. Only Ablai
[462] failed to renounce the protection of Russia, in spite of his secret relations with the Dzungars, for most of his subjects lived near the Russian border, and he sensed how useful it was to him to remain on good terms with Russia.

[439] Since he had to look out for the advantages of trade with the Russians in addition to the interests of his security, he requested that a market be opened in the fort of Troitsk, saying that Orenburg was too far away for him and particularly for most of his subjects to go there.

Batyr Djanibek, who had moved away from Orenburg after Abulkhair's death, asked for the same thing. The fulfillment of this request was equally advantageous to the Russian government, giving it greater means of surveillance over the Great Horde, and consequently a trade market was opened at Troitsk in 1750.

Before his death Galdan Tsyren had become reconciled with the Kazaks and seemed to wish to attach them to him more by kindness and good deeds than by terror. But his son had an entirely
[721] different view of the matter and renewed his attacks. The Middle Horde especially suffered greatly in 1751 near the Ulu.
[166 727] Mountains. The considerable loss of men taken prisoner by the Dzungars made it necessary for most of this horde to come closer to the Russian border and almost to mix with the Little Horde, after reaching the Ori River and the Mugodzhar Hills.

[439] In 1752 Russia's relations with Nurali Khan had less to do with Kazak matters than with the expansion of caravan trade with Khiva, the dominion of Bukhara, and Tashkent, and across these lands with the other states of Central Asia, even to the Indies, which were regarded as the source of all riches. Since the Indies were not far from the Kazak steppes, it was wished to make the first step across this country to reach that [224] region. This is why Nurali's help, if he were to give it in good faith, would have been of great importance to Russia in connection with trade.

[225 cont.]

x648 In 1753 the angry Nurali directed that the first caravan [579 from Khiva which went to Russia or returned from there was to be 439] pillaged. His orders were carried out. At once Kazaks of the Alimul descent line of the Karakitin tribe pillaged many Khivan and Turkomen merchants on the Sagiz, who were coming with goods under the escort of Kazaks of the same Alimul descent line but of the Chiklin tribe. Nepluev sent a civil official to the horde expressly to persuade the Khan to call the bandits to account, ●[662 deprive them of the goods, and return them to their owners. 681] Nurali replied decisively that the pillage had taken place by his order because Sultan Batyr, not content with disobeying him, was also seeking to arouse the Middle Horde against him, and that Batyr in agreement with his son was requiring the Khiva caravans to travel only by way of his own auls. Moreover, in order to justify himself and with the aim of arousing Russia against Khiva, he wrote to Orenburg that Kaip and Barak (or Batyr) were preparing to attack the Russian border, and in that case he advised that the land of Khiva be conquered and promised to take it in a few days if he were sent the assistance of 10,000 Russian troops with artillery.

[579 His goal in proposing his services was easy to guess, and 577] thus Nepluev and Tevkelev did not listen to his insinuations but repeated the demand for the return of the stolen merchandise of the robbed caravan and reproached him for conduct unbecoming to a khan. Their entreaties would have been useless if the interpreter charged with delivering them had not caused Nurali to hope, on instruction from Nepluev, that if he gave satisfaction to the [226] merchants he would gain the right to request the stipend from the government which had been assigned to him but had not been given all this time. This produced a greater effect than all the advice, and he busied himself at once with making his subjects give up the goods.

[661] Kaip, the khan of Khiva, acted quite differently. While the Russian government was causing the restitution to his subjects of what they had lost, this khan had a Russian caravan halted in Khiva, and in spite of the demands of the Orenburg authorities,

[226 cont.]
he did not release it until nearly a year had passed. When this caravan returned to Orenburg in 1754, an envoy of Kaip himself accompanied it as well as a Russian officer who had been in Khiva. The latter declared that he had met Sultan Erali on his way and that this prince had begged him to report to Nepluev that he and his brothers were ready to attack Khiva to avenge the insults of Sultan Batyr and his son, and that he planned to join the discontented subjects of Kaip, to put him to death, to seize his place, and to release the Russian prisoners who were then in Khiva. He asked only that in case he were unsuccessful Russia would promise to ransom him if he himself were taken.

To everyone's great astonishment the envoy from Khiva, instead of carrying out his master's orders, complained to the Russian government of the avidity and injustices of the Khan. He described the evils he made the people suffer, and in the name of all the Uzbeks, the people [race] to whom he belonged, he demanded help in order to dethrone the Khan.

Although this demand provided Russia with an opportunity to punish the Khivans for their perfidy and their prince for his insolence the year before in detaining a caravan from Orenburg, nevertheless the government then thought the conquest of Khiva more difficult than it was useful. Moreover Erali's pledge provided hope for acquiring some influence over this land without bloodshed. Consequently the government refused to acquiesce to the proposal of the Khivan envoy, who [227] had solicited help in overthrowing Kaip, but did not forbid him to ask help from the Kazak princes (1). Khan Nurali and Sultan Erali were

1. Ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of April 2, 1755.

permitted to march against Khiva and to seize it if luck was on their side. Also it was decided to grant Erali his ransom if he happened to be captured on this expedition.

Russia would certainly have gained an enormous advantage commercially if Abulkhair's sons had carried out their plan and

[229 cont.]

Sultan Ablai, who was as wise as he was enterprising, did not fail to profit from the quarrels of the Dzungarian princes, and he worked to prolong them, realizing the usefulness, both for his own security and that of the Kazaks on the outside, of weakening and parceling out their old enemies. To this end, he not only gave asylum to Amursan (2) and Lobacha (another

2. Amursan had broken away from China and wandered among the Kazak hordes. Later he sought refuge in Russia, where he died.

Dzungarian prince) in his village but went out to fight for them (3)

3. See the reports of Captain Iakovlev, who was then with the Middle Horde and who accompanied Ablai for some time as he followed Amursan and Lobacha in order to fight the Dzungars.

and helped them to destroy their own compatriots. When matters took a new turn, and the Chinese army won decisive victories over the Dzungars, Ablai joined the conquerors. But this change of allies did not cause him to change his goal, and he continued to exterminate his hateful neighbors as an ally of the Chinese, just as he had killed them when he was allied to the partisans of Amursan. But when Dzungaria had been completely vanquished, and the Chinese army, in order to complete its occupation, began to approach the Kazak steppes, Ablai came to meet them and acknowledged himself a vassal of the Emperor.

From this time on (1756) the vanity of the Chinese led them to include Ablai's pasture lands among their states, and he was immediately sent by Ch'ien Lung (4) a [230] letter patent

4. This is recorded by the Chinese who wrote the book Hsi Yu Wen Chien Lu, and we find an extract of it in Timkovskii, op. cit., I, p. 253.

[231 cont.]

x 648 Fortunately this region was then governed by Nepluev. His
[643 722] presence of mind and his actions averted the storm which menaced it. He immediately united the troops under his command at the points where defense was most necessary. He had reinforcements brought in from Kazan and also drew them from the Don Cossacks and from the khan of the Volga Kalmuks. While waiting, he armed the Meshcheriaks and Teptiars against the Bashkirs. He promised a complete pardon to those rebels who showed signs of repentance, and offered large pecuniary rewards for the heads of Batyr Shah and his principal accomplices. He sent declarations in the Tatar language to the Kazak hordes in the name of the akhun of Orenburg, in which this senior member of the Moslem clergy expressed his approbation of the Bashkir revolt but at the same time his fear that if they came to make themselves independent of Russia they might attack the Kazaks and finish by conquering them.

[726] When the auxiliary troops had entered the land of the Bashkirs, the latter were not powerful enough to resist the Russians, Kalmuks, Teptiars, and Meshcheriaks together, and they fled across the Ural River with their wives and children, numbering more than 50,000 persons. A large number perished crossing the
[727 662] river, and the others concealed themselves within the hordes. Those who remained in their settlements asked pardon, but their repentance was not sincere, and they were waiting for a new revolt. To avert this, and above all to prevent the Bashkirs from joining the Kazaks, Nepluev was obliged to take a cruel measure, but one which the times and circumstances made absolutely necessary.

x 648 He felt that it was necessary, for the security of the [232]
662 Orenburg line, to cause an irreconcilable hatred between the
661 Bashkirs and the Kazaks, for without this a reunion between them was always possible, and the inevitable result of such an alliance would be the ruin of all the Russian establishments on the Ural River. To achieve this end, he decided to place in the power of the Kazaks the wives and children of the Bashkirs who had left Russia to seek refuge among the Kazaks. Elizabeth's ministry had wished to protect the Russian border by a method more consistent with the views of kindness and humanity, but it was necessary to yield to

[232 cont.]
circumstances, and Nepluev, who had finally received the orders he had requested for the execution of his plan, at once informed the Khan, the Kazak sultans, and the most distinguished elders that as a reward for their faithfulness and devotion to Russia, the Empress was presenting them, as a gift, all the wives and daughters of the Bashkirs who were among them, on condition that the men be surrendered on the line, or at least driven out of the Kazak hordes. In addition, other rewards were promised for the extradition of the deserters.

The voluptuous Kazaks hastened to seize the women who were being abandoned to them. The Bashkirs wished to defend their families, but their number was toosmall and they could not resist. Some of them perished on the spot, others were surrendered to the Russians, and still others returned by themselves to their homes, waiting impatiently for the time to carry out their firm resolve to avenge this offense perpetrated by the Kazaks.

Rage and jealousy immediately aroused bands of avengers among the Bashkirs, who requested permission from the government to cross the Ural. Nepluev replied that the Empress did not grant permission to cross the border, but in secret he gave orders to the commanders of the forts and military posts to pay no attention to the people who crossed without permission into the steppes beyond the [233] Ural. Taking advantage of the pretended negligence of the guards, whole bands of Bashkirs crossed the Ural, fell upon the hordes, and began to pillage and massacre and to take away women and children.

Khan Nurali complained; he received the reply from Orenburg that the Kazaks had brought all these misfortunes upon their own heads by receiving the faithless deserters in their villages, and that all the Bashkirs were going to hasten to make similar exploits. Then Nurali's subjects took arms and began to repulse the attacks of their enemies, which the latter repeated constantly. The two people continued to destroy each other in this manner until Nepluev decided that it was fitting to call a halt to these disturbances. It was then strictly forbidden to the Bashkirs to cross the Ural, and it was suggested to the Kazaks that they retreat to

[233 cont.]

[648 663 661] the southern region of that river for their own safety. At the same time the border commanders were directed not to permit its crossing from either side, and guards were reinforced for this end.

[727 728] The bloodshed diminished, but the hatred between the two peoples has continued to this day. Mutual reprisals from time to time have helped to maintain it.

[661] These results could cause the Russian government to be accused of cruelty. But let us examine the circumstances: if one takes a glance at the geographical position of the military line and the region of Orenburg, one can see what sorts of people occupy it and its outlying areas. On the other hand, if one notes the small number of troops covering the Russian border, it will be granted that the measure taken by Nepluev was the only one which could save the region he governed, and perhaps most of the southeast part of Russia. The Kazaks who lived beyond the military line would not have been the only supporters of the Bashkirs. They could have joined the Tatars of Kazan, Orenburg, Simbirsk, and Penza, who lived in the interior of the empire, and even the Teptiars and Meshcheriaks, who because of the wise measures of the [234] Orenburg authorities served to punish the rebels instead [771] of revolting. All these peoples profess the same religion, and with all of them recognizing Mohammed and seeing the Christians only as infidels (kashfyr /sic/), what could one expect from their joining together?

If these matters are considered impartially, one sees that Russia had to decide to sacrifice either the Bashkirs or the Russians. If she sacrificed the former in order to save the latter, this conduct cannot be deserving of any blame.

[661] Khan Nurali as well as his two brothers, Erali and Aichuvak, did much to help the Orenburg authorities find the Bashkirs who had fled beyond the Ural River and to bring them back to the borders. In order to please Russia they not only fought the deserters, but also those Kazaks who defended them. Although this zeal was not entirely disinterested, still, since it was accompanied by other signs of being favorably disposed, the

[235 cont.]

Khan of having secret relations with the Orenburg authorities. As a result, in order not to confirm the opinions of his subjects on this idea, he asked that when he was sent reprimands for them in letters coming from Orenburg, they be sent for him also. Concerning known brigands, he said he could make them known in secret but could not deliver them, leaving the power of sending troops against them to the Russian government.

As a result the government resolved to increase Nurali's power and at the same time to devise a plan for punishing the Kazaks in such a way that they would feel at least once the power and the force of the empire. An order had already been given to draw a detailed map of the western part of the Kazak steppe, and the best means were already being sought for carrying on a campaign beyond the Ural. Everything foretold a terrible calamity for the Little Horde (2), when the Seven Years War opened between

2. See the ukase of June 10, 1756.

Russia and Prussia, and it was averted.

Nevertheless there was a great national assembly in the Little Horde in 1756, no doubt with the aim of discussing ways of averting the danger menacing them, and it opposed not only the demand of the Khan and his brothers to return the Russian prisoners and the Bashkir deserters, [236] but also undertook to help them. The Sultans Erali and Aichuvak pursued the interests of Russia with great warmth on this occasion.

At the beginning of 1757, Dunduk Dashi, deputy of the khan of the Volga Kalmuks, warned the governor of Astrakhan that all the Kazaks were intending to enter the Turkish possessions on the Kuban and that they had already requested permission from the Ottoman Porte through an embassy sent for this purpose. This news was difficult to believe. Nevertheless prudence demanded

[236 cont.]
that its probability be considered and also the basis for it. From information received about the Little Horde from an officer (1)

1. See Prince Urakov's reports of 1757 in the archives of the Border Commission in Orenburg.

who was sent there for the purpose, it was found out that the Kazaks had had no thought of the Kuban, but that Dunduk Dashi and two other Kalmuk princes had themselves sent confidential agents to Khan Nurali to warn him that the Crimean Tatars intended to attack Russia and to invite him to give them help, as the Kalmuks had themselves decided to do. Nurali had not rejected this proposal, but he had asked that he be warned of the moment when the Tatars would carry out their plan.

This duplicity on the part of Dunduk Dashi and his Kalmuk subjects' eternal hatred of the Kazaks caused the presumption that his real aim was to decide Nurali to march against the Russians and to profit by the absence of a large part of the Little Horde to attack its defenseless auls.

However this is only a presumption, and events did not prove that it was true. For neither the Crimean Tatars nor the Kazaks attacked Russia in 1757, and consequently the Volga Kalmuks had no occasion to help the first nor to destroy the second.

[237] The behavior of the Middle Horde in 1758 disturbed the Russian government more than the rumors of Nurali's alliance with the Crimean khan. Part of this horde had invaded the borders and taken the liberty of carrying off 220 Tatars of the Kuznetsk district as prisoners, people known by the name of Dvoedantsy (this name means "those who pay double tribute, or two tributes"). The Russians and the Dzungars levied tribute on these people at the same time. Another part of the Middle Horde, and this was the largest part, having seized the lands of the Dzungars who had been driven from their country, were coming closer to China and seemed too devoted to that empire.

[237 cont.]

x 648 Their chief, Sultan Ablai, had sworn an oath of fealty to Russia, but later he had been under the protection of the kungtaidji of the Dzungars, Galdan Tsyren, and finally, as we said, he received a patent as a Chinese prince from the Chinese emperor. Thus the assurances of submission which he repeated to the Russian government from time to time were meaningless, and it would have been even more unwise to rely on them since his relations with China were quite frequent.

In 1756 he received a Chinese ambassador for the first time. In 1757 another officer of the Emperor came to seek to convince the entire Middle Horde to solemnly acknowledge itself as subject to China.

[661 662] Ablai refused to carry out this request, not out of respect for the oath he had sworn to Russia but because he found this double position highly advantageous. First of all, it assured him greater independence and consideration from the two empires, and secondly, he was afraid to renounce his obedience to Russia completely because a large number of his subjects were nomadizing near the Russian borders in very favorable regions.

Russia, however, could not be satisfied with this apparent submission. In addition to the Kazak raids, she was then afraid of attacks from a much more [238] powerful enemy. For the Chinese army, which had ravaged Dzungaria had crossed the Siberian border and was threatening to enter the interior of the empire.

This fear was soon dispelled because the Chinese promptly retired into their own country, but the re-establishment of peace could not seem secure between the two empires as long as the differences remained unsettled concerning the surrender of the Dzungarian prince, Amursan, who had first acknowledged himself a vassal of China and later had sought asylum in Russia. His death ended the disagreement, but before it occurred and quiet was restored, the Orenburg authorities had opened relations with the Kazak princes of the Middle and the Little Hordes, by order of the government, [on the subject of] giving aid to Russian troops against China and of attacking the western territories of that state.

[238 cont.]

[648] On this matter Khan Nurali was presented /sic/ on March 19, 1758 with a letter patent in the name of the Empress inviting him to act in unity with the Russian troops, because the Chinese had violated the peace and invaded the Siberian border. It is not known why this letter patent was not sent. It is still preserved at Orenburg. It can be seen, however, by the business of that year that Nurali announced to the Russian officer who was sent to him expressly with gifts and orders to induce him orally to second [721] Russia that he consented to wage war against the Chinese and that he would hold himself in readiness to march.

Another officer announced, on his return from the Middle Horde, that Sultan Ablai had also promised to fight for the Russians against the Chinese. To corroborate his promises, Ablai sent two deputies who asserted that he had never acknowledged himself a subject of China but had always remained faithful to Russia and that he had relations with the Chinese and had expressed submission to them only out of fear. Although it was clear that these assurances [662] were false, the authorities intentionally pretended to be persuaded of [239] their sincerity (1), and Ablai not only received praise

1. During this same period, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote in one of its papers to the Russian Senate that Sultan Ablai had solemnly acknowledged himself a subject of China.

for his steadfast loyalty to Russia, but received a costly saber as [431] a reward, in the name of the Empress, and he was made to hope for other favors later.

[661] Khan Nurali also received several marks of good will from the Russian government because of his intention to fight the Chinese (2). Thus, when his son who was held hostage in Orenburg

2. Nurali even showed a desire to help the Russians in the war against Persia, although he had no means of carrying out his plan.

[240 cont.]

not ceased their thieving and laid waste the border provinces as before. But the departure of the Kazaks would have been very injurious in regard to trade, and it was to prevent this that Russia wished to keep her semisavage subjects in their old habitat.

It was essential to keep Sultan Ablai well disposed toward Russia, for he was acquiring more influence over his subjects every day and was becoming more fitted than anyone else to drive them in some high undertaking. A large part of the Middle Horde had already given him the title of khan. He himself in his relations with the Russian authorities did not yet give himself more than the title of sultan. But his power and his rank as a Chinese prince, to which Ch'ien Lung had elevated him, made it easier for him to change his title and to adopt that of supreme chief of all the Middle Horde, without any permission or cooperation on the part of Russia. This manner of behavior would have been contrary to the dignity of the empire, for the Middle Horde was among its subjects. But it was impossible to prevent such an event by [241] prohibiting it, and it would have been too injurious to take revenge by force of arms. It was therefore decided to induce Ablai by kindness and favors to himself request his investiture with the title of khan in the name of his people. In anticipation of this request, he was assigned an annual stipend, and an officer was sent to him charged with subtly showing him the path by which he could acquire the position of khan and to inform him that in order to reach this goal it was necessary that he give his son as hostage, following the example of Nurali.

Against all expectations Ablai received the Russian envoy in a very unfriendly manner and refused to present his son. In addition, it was learned soon after from a reliable source that Abul Mahmet, who had been created the khan of the Middle Horde by Russia, was still alive, and therefore the elevation of a new khan was put off to another time.

In 1760 the Kirghiz-Kazaks of the Middle Horde attacked the savage Kirgiz, or Buruts, and inflicted great losses upon them. Later they caused a disturbance in a sector of the new conquests of China and took several prisoners there. The Chinese demanded

X 648 [241 cont.]
of Ablai that they be returned, and sent an army to support their
[728] demand (1). The appearance of this army threw terror into the

1. See the reports of the interpreter Gordeev in the archives of the Border Commission in Orenburg.

Middle Horde. They not only undertook to satisfy the desires of the Chinese government, but a large number of Bashkirs, Barabin Tatars, and Russian prisoners were surrendered on the Russian border.

Nevertheless Russia owed the return of these prisoners less to the terror inspired by the Chinese armies than to the efforts and power of Ablai, who, although he was a subject of two empires,
● [62] sought for political reasons to prevent his people from making raids into Russia. In addition, this border opposite the Middle Horde was always much more secure than the military line along the Ural River.

Let us return now to the Little Horde, whose khan, together with [242] his brothers, seemed more devoted to Russia than Sultan Ablai.

[726 721] The Little Horde had not ceased to pillage the settlements along the borders from the beginning of spring until the middle of the summer, because the Volga Kalmuks had carried off much of its livestock during the preceding winter and because the guard along the Ural prevented the Little Horde from going along the Volga to recover its losses. Perhaps this first reason was joined by a second, which was less important but could also have influenced the conduct of the guard. During the autumn of 1759, Khan Nurali had come to Orenburg with his brothers, and the governor who had replaced Nepluev treated them with scant courtesy and, what was even worse, failed to make them any presents. This
[574] irritated them to such an extent that they did not wish to take leave of him, and they steadfastly refused to comply with any of his requests.

[242 cont.]

x 648 These moods were constantly increasing the audacity of the Little Horde, and the Khan pleaded as an answer the weakness 579 685 of his power. In this situation an order was sent from St. Petersburg (1) to require the Kalmuks to return the horses they had stolen

1. Ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of July 18, 1760.

and to punish the raids of the Kazaks by sending troops into their lands to find the offenders and to seize their possessions, or at least to arrest their kinsmen. But this was to be done without touching, under any circumstances, those who were strangers to them.

721 In 1761 part of the Little Horde attacked the Russian borders again and was again punished by force of arms. The reason for its attacks was the same as that for the year before. The Kalmuks had not returned the stolen horses, and the courtesies which were owed them had not been shown to the Khan and his brothers in Orenburg, although at the beginning of the year they had not taken part in the raids. In the autumn the Sultans Erali and Aichuvak were 579 in such a state of outrage at the behavior toward them [243] that they began to halt the caravans which were returning to Orenburg. Aichuvak even had the intention of withdrawing with the 167 Semirod descent line toward the Chinese border into the lands which had belonged to the Dzungars. In order to keep these two 661 sultans as well disposed toward Russia as they had been earlier, the higher authorities granted annual stipends to each of them in spite of the conduct of the local authorities in Orenburg.

x 648 Because of this state of affairs in the Little Horde and the ambiguous position held by Sultan Ablai, which nevertheless was not harmful to Russia, when Emperor Peter III was elevated to the throne, the Khan and the principal Kazak sultans were sent 662 letters with this information without demanding a new oath from them. It was believed that they would have refused, and it was decided not to carry out this formality until they should be in Orenburg themselves. In order to keep them in a state of

[243 cont.]

×648 subordinacy and keep them from maintaining friendly relations
662 with China, the government continued to spare neither expense nor effort. In the instructions presented to the border authorities of Orenburg and Siberia at the beginning of 1762, it was ordered that the most distinguished of the Kazaks should be flattered in
[431] every possible way, that presents and rewards should be distributed to them generously, and that those who wished it should have sheds and stables built for them near the border.

[342 It was ordered that engineers should be sent to Sultan Ablai
343] without delay to build him a house with outbuildings and the necessary storehouses, surrounding it all with a rampart to give it the appearance of a small fort (1). Such a mark of distinction was

1. A house really was built for Khan Ablai opposite the fort of Petropavlovsk, but only several years later.

very flattering to the vanity of a Kazak.

By these and other similar means, the Khan and the Kazak sultans were kept faithful to Russia, at least in [244] appearance. When Nurali, Ablai, and Aichuvak received the letters of information concerning the elevation of Empress Catherine II to the throne, they swore an oath of fealty to her immediately.

×648 It is worthy of remark that Ablai was not the only one who, having long been a vassal to two empires, swore an oath to the Empress of Russia, without intending because of this to give up his ties with China. Khan Nurali, following his example, decided about this time to enter into relations with the court of Peking. During this same year, 1762, he sent an embassy to Peking which left for that capital with the deputies of Sultan Batyr of the Middle Horde and Sultan Abulfenz, son of Abul Mahmet, khan of the Middle Horde. They were all loaded with presents by the Emperor, especially the deputies of Khan Nurali (1), who was puffed up by

1. See the reports of the interpreter Gordeev on his return from the Middle Horde in 1763.

[245 cont.]

[648 721] During the correspondence and the sending of couriers, the zealous Moslems joined their defenders from all sides, and by letters and sermons they incited everyone to come to their aid. Abul Mahmet, who was regarded as the khan of the Middle Horde, also received a letter of invitation, but since he had ceased to rule the Kazaks long before, he transmitted the invitation to [662] Ablai (1). The latter would no doubt have entered the general

1. The Bashkir, Tergulov, who was sent to the Middle Horde, brought a copy of this letter to Orenburg in the same year of 1763.

league of the Moslems if he had been a little less closely linked to the Chinese. But the court of Peking, in order to forestall his inclinations to help his coreligionists, had sent to Ablai shortly before the arrival of Abul Mahmet's letter a letter patent (2)

2. See the reports of the interpreter Gordeev.

which permitted him to occupy the environs of the Ili River and assured him constant protection. But at the same time [246] the [661] court of Peking took as hostage his father-in-law, Sultan Sultanamet, several elders and their children.

[662] It was also proposed to Nurali that he join the Afghans, and he did not categorically refuse. But the position of his horde and the circumstances did not permit him to march with an army toward the Chinese borders. The Kalmuks on one side and the Bashkirs on the other would not have failed to profit by the absence of the Kazaks and would not only have pillaged all their riches but also have carried off their wives and children into slavery. Nurali had reason to fear this, for the Bashkirs retained a vivid memory of the injuries they had suffered in 1755 from the Little Horde, many of which had not yet been avenged. And in 1762 the Kalmuks had suffered another blow from the Kazaks, who had reached the Volga by crossing the Caspian Sea over the ice.

[248 cont.]
x 648 secure hostages from Ablai to guarantee the freedom of the
[661] Russians sent to him.

x 648 Khan Nurali, who was proud of his relations with the army
662 of the Afghans and with China, wrote directly to the Empress in 1764, both to inform her of the invitation sent him by all the Moslems of Central Asia to take part in the war against China and also to acquaint her with the distinguished reception his embassy had had in Peking. These two circumstances inflated his vanity, and in his dreams of [249] his importance, he thought he could exact several concessions which he had already been refused. However, these repeated demands had no more success than they had had the first time. He was sent thanks from Russia for the news he had provided about the Afghans, and several gifts were added with a reply which was as polite as it was lacking in satisfaction. His horde did not remain calm, however, but con-
[721] tinued its raids against the Volga Kalmuks as much as against the Russian settlements on the border, nor did they renounce their usual dissensions, which are not worth a detailed description. Thus passed the years 1765 and 1766. In 1767 Russian troops punished them in a clear manner, by pursuing the brigands to the very middle of the horde.

x 648 There is no doubt that this chastisement made Nurali
662 violently angry. Since he needed Catherine's good graces, how-
643 ever, he hid his resentment for a long time. He was afraid that after his death the position of khan might pass to another family, and asked that a successor or deputy be designated while he still lived and that the Russian government ceremonially elevate his eldest son, Ishim, to this new post. This was a new desire, but it was not in opposition to Russian views. It was true that Russia could designate one of Nurali's brothers as khan of the Little Horde if she chose. But since there was no reason then for preferring them above other sultans and since the Empress Anna, when she promised Abulkhair to preserve the post of khan for posterity, did not fix any rule for the choice of his successors, Nurali's wish could be fulfilled. Also the particular qualities of Sultan Ishim were no obstacle to the accomplishment of his

[249 cont.]
father's aims. It was only necessary to know whether the creation of a deputy of the khan would not make the Kazaks discontented and whether they might not refuse to recognize their future chief. It was also necessary to know what [250] Ishim's personal inclinations toward Russia were and whether this novelty might not lead to some unpleasant consequences for her. It was ordered that research be made at the horde itself on all these points and that the results be sent to Petersburg. The authorities in Orenburg replied that according to the custom of the Kazaks, the position of khan should pass to one of his brothers after the death of Nurali and not to one of his sons. The Minister answered that the law of succession in private life could not be applied to succession to the title of khan, because this title always passed from one man to another by the choice of the people. Nevertheless it was decided, in order to avoid grumbling and dissension, to induce the Kazaks to choose Sultan Ishim themselves as the deputy of the khan and to confirm the choice of the people afterwards.

While studies were being made on this subject and the correspondence continued, the year 1771 arrived and the desertion of the Kalmuks caused the Kazaks matters to be forgotten, not only by the government but by the Kazaks themselves, as we will see later. This is why Khan Nurali's plan to elevate his son to the post of his deputy remained unfulfilled.

He could have attained his end if the death of his son, who arrived in Orenburg in 1769 where he was held as hostage, had not grieved him sorely and had not driven him into a stubbornness which was forgivable for a father but unpleasant for the Russian government. It was the second son he had lost in Orenburg, and both had died as children. Attributing their deaths to lack of care, he did not wish under any circumstances to give up another child of his own as hostage. And he himself refused to come to Orenburg, although he was invited to come several times by the authorities for conferences. Certain quarrels which arose between him and his brothers increased his troubles. The envy caused by the marks of attention given them by the Russian government, by using them more than it did him in its relations with the Little

European Kalmyk RFH
Kalmyk (Oirat) AM5

EK KO 648 K 648 EK KO [167] 668

[253 cont.]

after having taken counsel with the princes and the lamas (priests), he fixed the time of departure for the time when the Volga should be covered with ice. This arrangement was necessary because, although Ubashi himself was on the left bank of the river, a large part of the Torguts were on the right bank and could not join him with what they possessed except by crossing the ice.

This is why a [254] large part of the inhabitants of Astrakhan are still composed of Kalmuks today. For the winter of 1770 was warm and the rivers of southern Russia did not freeze, and Ubashi, after waiting in vain until the month of January for the Kalmuks from the right bank to join him, was obliged to abandon them and to leave with only those who were on the left bank.

They departed on the fifth of January, numbering 30,000 tents (1).

1. This is what Rychkov's journal says, but the Geographical Dictionary of the Russian Empire puts it at only 28,162.

● K EK KO ●[652]

As they approached the Yaik /Ural River/, the governor of Orenburg warned Khan Nurali that they were going to attack the Kazaks. Consequently, in the name of the supreme government, he granted Nurali the right to fight against them and to take as much booty from them as he could, on condition that they then be made to return to their former places of abode within our borders. The government of the borders of Siberia transmitted the same advice to the Middle Horde through Sultan Ablai and other chiefs. In order to confirm these declarations, on January 27, 1771 an imperial letter patent was presented in the name of Nurali and all the Kazak people to seize the Torguts.

EK KO K [721] 186

Every kind of instigation or advice was quite superfluous for the accomplishment of such designs. Every Kazak considered the chance to contribute to their execution a special bit of good fortune. Stirred with a violent hatred for all the Kalmuk descent groups, a heritage from their fathers and their most distant

European Kalmyk RF4
Kalmyks (first) AN5
Cossacks RD2

X K 648 [721 167] EK M0 648 [721 167]

[256 cont.]

The Kazaks alone could not seize the Kalmuks, and they did not need to. The aim of their cooperation was better accomplished by their endless and repeated attacks, their pillaging and the capture of a large number of prisoners. Sultan Aichuvak routed one section on the Sagiz. Nurali delivered a violent blow to another section toward the east, and he also carried off several victories over them near the Mugodzhar Hills and on the Ishim River. Ablai [257] fought them with constant success. In some regions he acted in accord with Sultan Abulfenz, and their united forces caused immense losses to the Kalmuks, especially through the number of prisoners they took.

Erali, sultan of the Great Horde and at the same time paladin of the court of Peking, invited Ablai to join him against the Kalmuks several times. The latter refused to aid him, but this did not stop him from carrying out the plan he had devised. Erali found other allies and caused the fugitives to undergo enormous losses in men, animals, and personal belongings. We saw the details of this event in the historical account of the Great Horde.

When they were finally free of the Kazaks, the Kalmuks fell into the hands of the Buruts, and the misfortunes which the latter inflicted upon them were much worse than those they had suffered previously, particularly with regard to losses in prisoners. The Buruts, who were as greedy as they were ferocious, pursued them all the way to the Chinese border, to the new line established on the lands of the Dzungars. Ubashi crossed this line, not as he had imagined when he left the Volga as an independent sovereign, but as a humble subject who wished to save his life. He brought to China less than half of the Kalmuks who left Russia with him, the rest having perished en route.

K X648 669 662 c 648 669 662

In 1773 and 1774 Pugachev's revolt caused violent agitation in the provinces in the southeast of Russia. The lands washed by the Ural River, almost from its source to its mouth, were most exposed to this, because the Yaik Cossacks were the first accomplices of the false Peter, and the Bashkirs were his first allies. The troops forming the border guard assembled in the principal forts to defend them against the rebels, and the borders remained

K [257 cont.]
x648 undefended. No one could protect them from the raids of outside
C
648 enemies, for everyone thought about saving himself from an
●K enemy from within who was far more dangerous. This is why
C
[669 there was reason to fear then that the Kazaks [258] might join
662] the rebels, enter the empire, and pillage and lay waste all the
border settlements. This did not happen because the Yaik Cossacks and the Bashkirs who made up Pugachev's army were enemies of the Kazaks.

Nevertheless, if this hatred prevented them from joining together to march into the interior, it did not protect the borders from the usual pillaging and raids which the Little Horde often repeated during Pugachev's revolt.

We see by a report from the commander who was then in the city of Yaisk (now Uralsk) that Nurali had armed quite a large number of his subjects but was making no move, waiting near the border for the outcome of the affair. One might suppose from the assurances he gave and the zeal with which he extradited several rebels who had taken flight that it was his intention to decide for the legitimate government, but in spite of this the local authorities were very much afraid that in case good luck favored the leader of the insurrection, Nurali might join him.

On this basis and to punish several raids, some across the borders, by the Kazaks during the revolt, the government of Orenburg sent a body of troops against the Little Horde in 1774, after the defeat of the rebels. These troops succeeded in capturing a large number of prisoners, carrying off many animals, and made the audacious bandits feel Russia's might.

K At this same time an event took place in the interior of
[643 the Little Horde which is worthy of attention. Several Turkmen
651] tribes who nomadized near the Caspian Sea chose Sultan Pirali, the second son of Nurali, for their khan. The new sovereign immediately left his father and went to live in the midst of his new subjects on the route which led from Khiva to Saraichik [259] and Guryev. He soon made a name for himself through the high duties he exacted from the merchant caravans.

K In 1775 the Kazaks did not disturb Russia. The Little
[727 Horde remained quiet because it still felt the painful consequences

[260 cont.]

x 648
[439]

subject on December 17, 1775, the geodetic specialist Vasiliev drew a map of the environs of the Emba and the rivers which flowed into it.

execution, as had all the others which had been made previously.

[721] It can be seen in the reports from the governor of Orenburg, Reinsdorf, to the Empress in the months of March and April, 1776 that the Little Horde had once more begun acts of hostility against Russia, and although after the Russian troops entered the steppes in 1774, the border authorities had been forbidden to send troops beyond the Ural, yet Khan Nurali himself had asked for armed assistance to bring his restless subjects to their senses.

[642] Sultan Ablai, on the contrary, was then becoming more powerful, older, and wilier from day to day. Having had more experience than any of the contemporary Kazak princes and being known for his intelligence, dreaded by his subjects, and distinguished for his ties with the empress of Russia and the emperor of China (2) /sic/,

2. The best known among them was Sultan Dair, son of Barak, who complained to the governor of Orenburg that Ablai had unjustly usurped the title of khan.

he had every possible right to the post of chief of the Middle Horde. Sure of his ability, he knew how to attract followers by his importance and his prudent behavior. He threatened his enemies with his power and acknowledged himself now a subject of Russia and now that of China (3), depending on the occasion,

3. Some Kazaks who came within our borders stated that Ablai spoke Chinese.

being in fact a completely independent sovereign. One can notice this especially after the year 1771, when he made less

[643] effort to conserve appearances of an external submission to Russia, and having become less hypocritical, he openly took the title of khan.

[261 cont.]
643 deliver the objects. Ablai did not wish to swear a new oath of
643 loyalty even under this condition. He believed that the demand that was being made for these [262] external signs of submission had the goal of rendering him suspect to the Chinese, to whom he was then particularly attached. For this reason all the proposals which Russia made him were fruitless, and the certificate and the marks of the position of khan remained at the fort of Petropavlovsk, opposite which he lived in the house which the Russian government had had built for him.

648 Ablai's disobedience became more patent when the Russian
662 government turned down his request for aid in men to make war against the Buruts, and he openly refused to return the Russian prisoners in his horde, as well as the Turkmen whom the Kalmuks had taken away from the Astrakhan government in their flight and who had remained with the Kazaks. The government was justly annoyed by Ablai's audacity and insolence, and withdrew his stipend and sought to humble him by supporting one of the sultans among his enemies. Measures had even been taken to this effect, and it was thought for a moment to take him prisoner
[721] and send him into the interior of Russia. But at this time he assembled troops, attacked the Buruts, delivered a severe defeat to them, took hostages from them, and returned to nomadize in the environs of Turkestan.

648 While he was living there, he built a house surrounded by a
[361] rampart on the little river Talash, near the Ulu-Tau Mountains for his son, Sultan Hadil, and at the entreaty of his Kazak subjects of the Great horde, he founded a village nearby, which he populated with Karakalpaks who were accustomed to agriculture. As
[166] for the Buruts he had captured, he made them go north of the Middle Horde, where they are still living today with their children, making up the tribe of the Djany or Iany-Kirgiz, which means New Kirgiz.

[764] In 1781 Ablai returned toward the Russian frontier, but he died on the way at the age of 70 and was buried in Turkestan. As soon as this news arrived in Peking, the Chinese government

[264 cont.]

The election of Vali by Ablai's Kazak subjects and his confirmation by Russia did not prevent another khan from appearing in the same horde. He was chosen by the Naiman descent line and confirmed by the emperor of China. The descendants of the ancient Naimans, who had blended into the mass of the Kazak people of the time, obeyed, at the time of Ablai, Sultan Abulfenz, son of Abul Mahmet and brother of Pulat, the khan of Turkestan. And although he had had some relations with the Orenburg authorities and had even requested a stipend, he was nevertheless a subject of China. He died in 1783, leaving a son named Bupu and a son-in-law, Khan Khodja, son of Barak, whose acquaintance we have already made. One of these princes was to inherit Abulfenz's authority, but each had his partisans, who could not come to an agreement on the choice and who set the entire Naiman descent group in commotion with their quarrels. The majority of the votes were in favor of Khan Khodja, however, so that this prince became the sovereign of the former subjects of Abulfenz, and the troubles were ended. When the emperor of China learned this, he sent him a certificate as khan by one of his high officials. The ministry in Peking considered this a necessary measure because it regarded the entire Middle Horde as subjects of China and because it had named Ablai a Chinese prince. When it was seen that Ablai's son Vali was submitting himself to Russia, he was speedily replaced, for the dignity of the empire, by another Kazak prince who was submissive.

With the exception of Vali, the other sons and close kinsmen of Ablai had few relations with Russia. Some of them proudly acknowledged themselves to be subjects of China.

This was the behavior adopted by Sultan Chingis, who [265] marched in 1784 with an army raised in the steppes to put down a revolt which had broken out in Tashkent. Another brother of Khan Vali, Sultan Tyz, who was also devoted to China, is known to us only for his hatred of the Buruts.

Tyz was not the only one to attack his bloodthirsty neighbors. Several sections or branches of the Kazaks who lived near the Chinese borders continued to maintain the war against the Buruts

[270 cont.]
X 648 721 had been provoked. This band was composed of 3,000 men under the command of Batyr Syrym, of whom we have already spoken. For a long time it threatened several forts on the Orenburg line, [724] and finally this daring band succeeded in winning a considerable victory at the fort of Tanalytsk and against a body of troops sent against them.

X 648 668 In 1785 a revolution began in the internal administration of the Little Horde, which is of great note to the historian and very interesting to the political scientist. The end for which it was undertaken held to the plan conceived by Catherine and her ministry to establish peace among the Kazaks. We shall describe the means by which the local authorities attained such a desirable result. Baron Igelstrom, who was then appointed to the post of governor general of Orenburg and commander of the entire Russian border from the Caspian Sea to the Tobolsk gubernia, found the Little Horde in a state of violent agitation and the borders of the [721 provinces in his care in danger. Troops of armed Kazaks riding about the left bank of the Ural River caused the constant fear of an 727] attack and kept the peasants from busying themselves with the work in the fields. And whenever they found a chance, they carried men off, pillaged, and led away the livestock. The detachment commanded by Batyr Syrym showed itself even more daring.

X 648 721 ● 662 His attack on the fort of Tanalytsk was one of the first events which took place after the arrival of Baron Igelstrom in Orenburg. In order to take advantage of this fact, Khan Nurali hastened to inform the new governor that all the brigandage was committed by Kazaks who were defying his orders; that Syrym was not satisfied with denying his authority, but was even arousing the entire horde against him, and that in order [271] to prevent the greatest disasters, both for Russia and for the Kazaks, it was indispensable to punish the rebels by force and to remove the fomenters of disorder from the horde. The Khan concluded as before by acknowledging his weakness and requesting help to bring the bandits to their proper duties.

[271 cont.]

All this was true, but no one paid any attention to it because no one in Orenburg believed in Nurali's sincerity, and the new government, being prejudiced against him, believed the re-establishment of peace in the horde to be impossible without changing its administration, or at least without a new khan.

Baron Igelstrom's first choice for a new khan was Kaip, son of Sultan Batyr, who had reigned in Khiva and was driven out for his rapaciousness and cruelty. We have spoken of him several times, as well as of his father. The central government could not ignore the acts of hostility committed by this sultan against the Russians, nor his conduct in Khiva, and therefore his election was put off until more detailed information could be collected concerning him (1). And in the end it did not take place (2).

1. Rescript from the Empress to Baron Igelstrom of November 25, 1785.

2. A similar rescript of November 12, 1786.

Kaip was proposed for this position twice. The first proposal was brought about by two plans drawn up by Baron Igelstrom, who had firmly decided to introduce a new form of government in the Little Horde.

In one of these plans he proposed to divide the horde into three sections, according to the number of its descent lines, namely those of Semirod, Baiulin, and Alimul, and to give each a khan, but to limit the authority of these new chiefs so that they would bear only an honorary title and be, in effect, only the executors of the commands of the supreme head of the government of Orenburg.

[272] The other plan was to abolish the position of khan in the Little Horde completely and gradually to apply to them the code given by Catherine for the administration of guberniyas.

This last thought was drawn from one of the cherished as well as most remarkable works of the Empress, and thus it was especially commended and confirmed in St. Petersburg.

[273 cont.]
privileges which the latter held by birth, Syrym proposed that the position of khan was unnecessary and sought to make up for his own lack of illustrious ancestors by personal merit. Under his influence the national assembly swore the oath of loyalty to the empress of Russia without the least opposition, promised to stop its raids, and to apply its efforts to maintain peace in the horde and to obey all the commands of the Russian government. But it demanded as a guarantee of Russia's protection, that Abulkhair's descendants, including Nurali himself, should forever lose the right to be khans of the Little Horde.

Can one fail to recognize Syrym's ambition in this demand? Nurali and his brothers were poor leaders because of their weakness, not because of their cruelty. Thus they could not have incurred the hatred of the entire horde to the point of forcing it to consider their removal from power as necessary to their peace. Then the government even went so far as to say that it was no longer up to it to change the course of affairs, because the idea of abolishing the position of khan had long since been adopted. Moreover, the peaceful inclinations of the national assembly and Syrym's clever actions seemed favorable to the re-establishment of calm within the horde.

[274] Actually, the year 1786 stood out among all other years, especially the two preceding, because of the calm which reigned during its span and the more frequent relations between the Russians and the Kazaks. It is true that there were also several disturbances springing from the abasement of all the sultans, especially the descendants of Abulkhair. Nevertheless this does not prevent our notice of the fact that the greatest exchanges of livestock (1) on the line took place in 1786 and 1787, and in the

[439]

1. See the table on the quantity of livestock exchanged by the Kazaks with the Russians from 1745 to 1820 that we have included in the statistical article [pp. 426 to 427, not translated].

[275 cont.]
x 648 Baron Igelstrom not only forgot Batyr Syrym's former actions but even took him under his special protection, chose him as the instrument of his operations, maintained a correspondence with him at once, and held conferences with him, as though he were the chargé d'affaires or the representative of the entire national [662 152] assembly. When the Khan was informed of these details, he wrote that Syrym was a knave who was deceiving the government and that he had no thought of re-establishing good order but only considered his own interests. The Khan also said that he attributed his own opinions to the entire assembly and that in his heart he was a sworn enemy of Russia, etc. These accusations were vindicated by time, but coming from the lips of a weak and humiliated sovereign and under circumstances which explicitly belied his accusations, they could not appear true and were accordingly allowed to slip into oblivion. It is true that Nurali added certain unequivocal signs of his devotion to Russia, for at this time he [728] released several Russian prisoners whom he had brought to the horde, offered his children as hostages, and placed himself at the disposal of the government. But he was too late. His personal submission was no longer needed. What was wanted was the force of power or of genius, which alone was capable of acting upon the horde.

x 648 643 661 Syrym had already acquired this force by his intelligence, his influence over the people, and by the protection of the border authorities. Thus it appeared that he promised greater advantages than the Khan, who had shown nothing but weakness for 37 years. The fate of this unhappy prince deserves pity. Yet following the opinion he had formed of Nurali and the system which had been adopted, Baron Igelstrom no longer found it possible to keep him in the horde. Thus he asked permission to [276] have the Khan brought into Russia, and once he had been received (1),

1. By a rescript of the Empress of June 3, 1786.

[276 cont.]
he was no less quick to profit from it, as he was soon presented with an opportunity to do.

Syrym's followers, as much to please him as to satisfy their own greediness, did not stop with committing offenses against Nurali in all sorts of ways, but ended by attacking villages and pillaging everything they found there. Nurali, defenseless, turned to the power of Russia and requested an armed guard from the border authorities. When he was refused, he decided to withdraw to Orenburg for a time in order to save his life, and from this city he was taken to Ufa, where he died four years later. His brother Aichuvak was detained during this time in Uralsk.

It is useless to describe the impression which these events gave to Nurali's children and the other descendants of Abulkhair. The eldest and the best known, because of his intelligence and valor, was Sultan Erali, who had had frequent relations with Russia, as we have seen. But six years before he had conquered the Karakalpaks and lived with them on the Syr [Darya] (2). He

2. Bekehurin, an interpreter of Orenburg, traveled on the Syr in 1781, and found Sultan Erali was already sovereign of the Karakalpaks.

knew perfectly well who was mainly responsible for the misfortunes of his brothers and who had caused them to lose the protection of Russia, which Abulkhair and his line had had for more than half a century. Anxious to avenge the grievances of his family, he resolved to attack Syrym and marched against him with an army which was few in number but could be counted upon. Luck smiled upon Sultan Erali on this expedition. He captured the representative of the national assembly, the title which Syrym gave himself.

At this same time other tribes of the Little Horde, who were not attached to Abulkhair's family but also did not wish to follow the incitements of Syrym or of his principal accomplices and who were accustomed, furthermore, to having khans,

[278 cont.]

643 promise given to Abulkhair by Empress Anna to choose khans
177 only from among his successors. Third, Nurali had on his side
643 not only his kinsmen but also the most powerful princes of the Middle Horde, the most important of whom was Sultan Khudai Mendi, a man as distinguished for his intelligence as for the large number of his followers and the authority he had acquired over them.

648 Vali Khan took a great interest in Nurali's fate and argued
664 vigorously with the Russian government (2) on his behalf, and he

2. See Baron Igelstrom's report of December 18, 1786.

also wrote the same thing and warmly defended the descendants of Abulkhair, whom he called the father of all the Kazak khans subject to Russia and the first creator of the submission of the Little Horde (3). Finally, in 1787 a large part of the national

3. See another of Baron Igelstrom's reports, that of September 29, 1787.

assembly expressed the desire to see Nurali returned to the horde, out of respect for Abulkhair, who was considered a saint by many Kazaks. All these circumstances spoke in Nurali's favor, but they did not promise peace among the Kazaks in the future. Therefore, the execution of the latest intentions of the Russian government, to introduce in the Little Horde an organization conforming to that of the interior guberniyas continued unabated.

648 Meanwhile Batyr Syrym regained his freedom and once again
662 began to influence the people in accord with the plans of the
177 Orenburg authorities, which he seconded as long as they were not contrary to his own views. Under the guise of devotion to Russia and gratitude to the local authority which had chosen him as its instrument, Syrym helped Baron Igelstrom greatly in the reforms which he made in the Little Horde in 1787, which we are about to describe.

[279 cont.]

×648 After this beginning Baron Igelstrom, who felt, on the basis of Syrym's assurances, that the establishment of peace in the Little Horde was inevitable, [280] prepared to build cities, mosques, caravansaries, and schools in the middle of the steppes. [177] He reported this to the Empress and planned to comply in everything with the organization of the provinces of the interior and to the regulations published in Russia on public education.

[181] This gratifying and consoling hope did not last long. By the following year, 1788, it was beginning to weaken, and soon it disappeared completely. The people, who had long been [662 578 643] accustomed to excitement and brigandage, tired of their inactivity and once more began their old disputes, driven from one side by Nurali's kinsmen, from another by Kaip, and from a third by Batyr Syrym. The followers of the latter were the most numerous and the most active. The sultans could have no power over them, as they were no longer respected. The elders [692] chosen to supervise the conduct of the people, as well as the heads of the tribunals, had no authority and dared not give commands, and followed the stream which carried them along.

[721 667] These internal circumstances were joined by others which acted from outside. The Turks, then at war with Russia, sought to incite the Bukharans against the Russians. The Bukharans aroused the Little Horde, and it was to this end that they suggested to Erali, at first, that they help him take back Khan Nurali by force. Later they entered into relations with Syrym and sent him ×648 and those of his line an appeal couched in these terms:

721 771 186 662 "To the brave warriors, beys, and elders, Sarytai bey, Syrym Batyr, Shukurali bey, Sadyrbek, Barak Batyr, Dajdan Batyr, peace and blessing. And now our words. Glory to the most high God! By His holy grace, all our affairs are running smoothly. We have but one sorrow. Not long ago an ambassador came to us from the Turkish sovereign, vicar of God, with a letter informing us that the infidel Russians have assembled from all sides and, in alliance with the seven Christian states, have started to march. [281] Since you live closer to the Russians than we do and, consequently, know better how to fight them, we propose

[281 cont.]
to all the servants of God and followers of Mohammed who trust in the protection of Our Prophet, to join the Turkish army with goods and with sentiments, and to go and strike the infidels. This is a matter for which a great reward can be obtained. And if in this war anyone fails to do all the harm possible to the infidels, he must fear the great anger of God, and may not hope for the protection of Our Prophet. Besides, we beg that there should be faith in the words of the envoy.

"We learn that you Kazaks do not have your own wise and learned men, and for this reason you cannot carry out the laws of Our Prophet at all. And since the Lord God has commanded that his principles be known and that prayers be offered in conformity to his principles, fasting he observed, and alms be given of one's possessions, then the knowledge of letters in order to read books belongs to the service of God. There is a source of wisdom among us today. For from all the peoples, including the Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Arabs, and Turkmen, there are many who study in our schools, but from you, who are such a numerous people, there is not a single student. In the Koran, Our Prophet has prescribed that every believer, not only the husband and the wife, but the small children as well, should study the law and fear God and that when they are able, they should inform others. For this reason we advise you to send here two or three men from each tribe to be instructed. If they will not listen to your urging, then take two or three men from each tribe by force. They will receive their subsistence from us, and when they will have finished their studies and are skillful in the law, they will return to their homes with the principles of piety and the habit of prayers and fasting. And if you have the means of carrying out our proposal, O Kazak people, and leave it without execution, then [282] you will become traitors to God in this world, and on the day of resurrection you will burn in the fires of hell. If we did not offer this truth for your consideration, we ourselves would deserve the name of infidels in this world, and we should expose ourselves in the future world to the eternal fires of hell.

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"In closing, we are respectfully, in the year of the Hegira 1202 (1788 after the birth of Jesus Christ)."

To this letter was affixed the black seal of the atalyk of Bukhara (first minister of Shah Murat).

Syrym, in spite of his ties with the Orenburg authorities, replied to the atalyk that he himself and his followers were ready to obey the commandments of God, but that they could not begin the war until the Bukharans and the other Asiatic peoples had entered Russia.

This step came to the knowledge of the Russian government, and Syrym began to be suspected and his duplicity discovered, and all confidence in him was lost. On his part, he did not wish to suffer humiliation, and although he still seemed devoted for a certain time, at the same time he no longer seemed so disposed to agree with the views of the Orenburg government. Meanwhile his followers were again pillaging Russia as before. The raids on the borders increased daily. The disputes became much stronger in the horde. While the sultans and part of the people demanded a khan, the elders charged with supervising the conduct of the people, as well as the members of the tribunals, did not carry out anything, never met, did not look into matters, did not come to Orenburg except to collect their stipends, and had no influence over the horde.

In this state of affairs there was no longer anything else to do but to return to the old administration and to re-establish the position of khan. An auspicious pretext was offered for this re-establishment when Nurali, at his death, commanded, among his last wishes to his children, that they remain faithful to Russia.

[283] The Russian government's sole desire to designate a new khan for the Little Horde was a bolt of lightning to Syrym and stripped off the mask with which he had covered himself. When he saw his most cherished hopes destroyed and had lost all his importance, he no longer had the will or the need to restrain himself. For this reason he returned to his early pursuits and once more openly began to act as a brigand.

[285 cont.]
pleaded since 1784 to be admitted under the suzerainty of Russia, once more repeated his request. His letter was sent to St. Petersburg, and on October 31 of the same year an ukase was given to receive him as a vassal of the empire.

Meanwhile Syrym was manifesting more and more his desire to avenge the destruction of his power and the loss of the influence he had wielded in the horde during the time when the position of khan was considered unnecessary. At this time he had not completely lost the regard of his compatriots, which he owed to his earlier importance and his personal bravery. He still had enough means of doing harm to Russia and to the sultans who were devoted to Russia, above all when he had united what was left of his group with the subjects of Kaip, who had died shortly before and who had bequeathed to his children all the hatred of the descendants of Abulkhair which he had inherited from his father and his grandfather. After Kaip's death, the Kazaks who had recognized his authority passed under that of his sons, Sultans Abulgazy and Burkan (1). Syrym allied himself [286] with them

1. Their third brother, Shirgazy, was then in the service of Russia. He lived [286] in Petersburg for a long time, became accustomed to the glitter of Catherine's court, and seemed to have become European. But when he returned to the horde at the beginning of this [19th] century, he showed himself to be the worthy descendant of his bloodthirsty ancestors. Nothing of remark is known about his other brothers.

and knew how, with the superiority of his intelligence, to make them the instruments of his plans.

Being unable to do without their help, Syrym ceased to inspire the people with contempt for the position of khan in general, as he had done before. But he proclaimed everywhere

[286 cont.]
that Erali's election was illegal, claiming that Baron Igelstrom had concluded an agreement with the Little Horde by which he had promised, in the name of the government, to remove the descendants of Abulkhair forever from the position of khan. Using every possible weapon against Russia, he did not forget to call the Koran to his aid, pointing out that it is forbidden to Moslems to submit themselves to Christian powers. To this same end he sought, in 1791, to induce the Kazaks to end their barter with the Russians and, if possible, to withdraw into the interior of the steppes. He spread the rumor that he was expecting the Bukharan army which the khan of that country had promised him. He sent his son to Khiva in 1793 to ask for similar aid, and although he received a flat refusal, he boasted nevertheless of the success of the embassy. In 1792 he addressed an extremely insolent letter to Peutling, chief of the viceroyalty of Ufa, in which it was not enough to insult him by the most coarse expressions, but the Empress was attacked as well. Finally, in his rage, he solemnly declared war against Russia. The results of this declaration were several new raids by bandits, made by Syrym upon Ilezkoi [Iletski] Gorodok [now Ilek], Fort Kalmuk, and various other places on the Iletsk line.

Khan Erali could not make his enemy see reason, and therefore in 1792 he demanded that troops be sent to the horde to punish the offenders. The Empress did not grant this request. Rightly contemptuous of Syrym's malicious intentions, she [287] did not wish to spill the blood of the Kazaks, especially since the severe defeat they had suffered in 1790 in the midst of their steppes at the hands of the Ural Cossacks had in no way corresponded to her humanitarian intentions nor to the expectations of the ministry.

In the midst of the disturbances which were then troubling the Little Horde, we should note Erali's request for a house to be built for him near the fort of Orsk and the request of Sultan Ishim for the construction of a city in the midst of the steppes. Circumstances did not permit the satisfaction of this last demand at that time, but Erali's request would have been granted if he had not died in the month of June, 1794, after ruling the Little Horde for three years.

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In 1793, Lieutenant General Strandman, commandant of the Siberian line, sent a body of troops into the Kazak steppes which liberated the Turkmen prisoners. Vali was so distressed at this loss that he complained to the Empress. The only satisfaction he received was the permission to come to St. Petersburg to explain all his needs and his requests, and he did not take advantage of this because he was afraid to leave the horde. Finally, after the death of his brother Chingis, he announced that all his complaints had been made on the advice of his brother, and he reconciled himself with the local authorities and promised to help them in all matters.

This move, however, was not a proof of perfect devotion to Russia, for he wished to maintain his relations with China, following the example of his father, and to this end he sent his son to the emperor of China in the winter of 1794-95 to bear witness to his submission. At the same time he continued to oppress the tribal chiefs, except those who were attached to Russia. The result of this behavior was that in January, 1795 two sultans, 19 elders, 43,360 of their subjects and 79,000 other Kazaks submitted a petition to the Empress asking to be delivered from Vali's rule and to be accepted under the direct dominion of the Russian government.

The execution of this demand was too difficult and promised no advantage to Russia. In the meantime Vali showed signs of repentance and raised the hope that he would become reconciled with the malcontents, and therefore things remained in their original state.

The part of the horde which lived along the Verkhne-Uralsk line and had the Bashkirs for neighbors, as we said above, in 1795 gave the most [296] convincing proof of the truth of our reflections about the causes which made the Middle Horde more peaceful than the Little Horde. At the time when the tribes and divisions of the Kazaks along the border were peacefully carrying on trade with the Russians on the Siberian line, it made several raids in the districts of Chelyabinsk and Verkhne-Uralsk, laid waste several villages then, took many prisoners, and carried off quite a large number of